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Android is currently the most popular operating system for mobile devices in the
world. However, its openness is the main reason for the majority of malware to be
targeting Android devices. Various approaches have been developed to detect malware.
Unfortunately, new breeds of malware utilize sophisticated techniques to defeat
malware detectors. For example, to defeat signature-based detectors, malware authors
change the malware’s signatures to avoid detection. As such, a more effective approach
to detect malware is by leveraging malware’s behavioral characteristics. However, if a
behavior-based detector is based on static analysis, its reported results may contain a
large number of false positives. In real-world usage, completing static analysis within
a short time budget can also be challenging.
Because of the time constraint, analysts adopt approaches based on dynamic
analyses to detect malware. However, dynamic analysis is inherently unsound as
it only reports analysis results of the executed paths. Besides, recently discovered
malware also employs structure-changing obfuscation techniques to evade detection by
state-of-the-art systems. Obfuscation allows malware authors to redistribute known
malware samples by changing their structures. These factors motivate a need for
malware detection systems that are efficient, effective, and resilient when faced with
such evasive tactics.
In this dissertation, we describe the developments of three malware detection systems to detect complex malware: DroidClassifier, GranDroid, and Obfusifier.

DroidClassifier is a systematic framework for classifying network traffic generated
by mobile malware. GranDroid is a graph-based malware detection system that
combines dynamic analysis, incremental and partial static analysis, and machine
learning to provide time-sensitive malicious network behavior detection with high
accuracy. Obfusifier is a highly effective machine-learning-based malware detection
system that can sustain its effectiveness even when malware authors obfuscate these
malicious apps using complex and composite techniques.
Our empirical evaluations reveal that DroidClassifier can successfully identify
different families of malware with 94.33% accuracy on average. We have also shown
GranDroid is quite effective in detecting network-related malware. It achieves
93.0% accuracy, which outperforms other related systems. Lastly, we demonstrate
that Obfusifier can achieve 95% precision, recall, and F-measure, collaborating its
resilience to complex obfuscation techniques.
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Chapter 1

Introduction

Android is currently the most popular smart-mobile device operating system in the
world, holding about 80% of worldwide market share. Due to their popularity and
platform openness, Android devices, unfortunately, have also been subjected to a
marked increase in the number of malware and vulnerability exploits targeting them.
According to a recent study from F-Secure Labs, there are at least 275 new families
(or new variants of known families) of malware that currently target Android [1]. On
the contrary, only one new threat family on iOS was reported.
Among these malware families, one type of attack involves sending sensitive and
private user’s information to external sites. Because these malicious actions generate
trails of network traffic, it is possible to detect apps that perform such malicious actions
by observing network activities. In the past, security analysts have used network
connectivity analysis to identify mobile applications to facilitate network management
tasks [2]. Because cybercriminals have also exploited Android’s network connectivity to
glean sensitive information or launch devastating network-level attacks [3,4,5], studying
network traffic going into or coming out of Android devices can yield unique insights
about the attack origination and patterns. Therefore, researchers have statically or
dynamically analyzed network information to detect malicious Android apps.
Static analysis approaches [6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11] perform sound analysis in an offline
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manner and thus incur no runtime overhead. However, static analysis can result in
excessive false positives. Moreover, they are often ineffective when various forms of
obfuscation and encryption techniques are applied to the program codes. Dynamic
analysis approaches, on the other hand, are more precise but incur additional runtime
overhead [12, 13, 14]. as they need to incorporate the apps’ actual runtime behaviors
that may be triggered by dynamically downloaded codes from remote servers. However,
the analysis results are unsound. Furthermore, recent reports indicate that dynamic
analysis can be easily defeated if an app under analysis can discover that it is being
observed (e.g., running in an emulator), and as a result, it behaves as a benign
app [15, 16, 17].
Due to the limitations above, it is not a surprise that recently introduced malware
detection approaches perform hybrid analysis, leveraging both static and dynamic information. In general, hybrid analysis approaches statically analyze various application
components of an app, execute the app, and then record runtime information [18,19,20].
These approaches then use both static and dynamic information to detect malicious
apps, which can lead to more in-depth and precise results. However, most of the
existing Android malware analysis approaches detect Android malware by matching
manually selected characteristics (e.g., permissions) [6, 11, 21, 22] or predefined programming patterns [8, 10]. The existing approaches do not capture the programming
logic that leads to malicious network behaviors.
Our key observation about a typical hybrid analysis approach is that: a significant
amount of efforts are spent on constructing various static analysis contexts (e.g.,
API calls, control-flow graphs, and data-flow graphs). Yet, the malicious network
behaviors are only induced by specific programming logic, i.e., the network-related
paths or events (e.g., distilling and sending information to a suspicious C&C server)
that have been dynamically executed. This can lead to wasteful static analysis efforts.
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Furthermore, running an instrumented app or modified runtime systems (e.g., Dalvik
or ART) to log events can incur significant runtime overhead (e.g., memory to store
runtime information, and network or USB bandwidth to transport logged information
for processing). In the end, it is still challenging for hybrid analysis to be able to
complete its analysis within a given time budget (e.g., five minutes) as statically
analyzing an app can yield varying time depending on the size and complexity of the
app under analysis. Adhering to a time budget is an important criterion for real-world
malware analysis and vetting systems.
Code obfuscation, a common approach used by developers to protect the intellectual
properties of their software [23] by making reverse-engineering more difficult, has
also been used by malware authors as an anti-analysis tool to hide malicious code
within an application. As such, it is not surprising that we have seen applications of
various obfuscation techniques to malicious apps to evade the security analysis. These
techniques are especially effective in defeating existing malware and virus scanners,
which often rely on signature matching or program analysis. In this work, we applied
various obfuscation techniques to known malware samples and evaluated them by
VirusTotal [24]. The analysis results indicate that many existing techniques deployed
by VirusTotal would misclassify known but obfuscated malware samples as benign.
Applying code obfuscation to malware can also defeat state-of-the-art machine
learning-based malware detection systems [9, 11, 13, 25, 26, 27]. These existing systems
extract unobfuscated features from benign and malware Android samples to build
classifiers to detect malware. One recent work [28] has shown that when obfuscated
Android malware samples are submitted to these classifiers, they can be miscategorized
as features used by these classifiers are now more ambiguous due to obfuscation [29].
Developing an obfuscation-resilient systems would prevent malware authors from simply
obfuscating known malware for redistribution.
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1.1

Contributions

The contributions of this dissertation are as follows:
1. We implement DroidClassifier, which considers multiple dimensions of mobile
traffic information from different families of mobile malware to establish distinguishable malicious patterns. Besides, we design a novel weighted score-based
metric for malware classification, and we further optimize the performance of
our classifier using a novel combination of supervised learning (score-based classification) and unsupervised learning (malware clustering). The clustering step
makes our detection phase more efficient than prior efforts, since the subsequent
malware classification can be performed over clustered malware requests instead
of individual requests from malware samples.
2. We develop GranDroid based on system-level dynamic graphs to detect malicious network behaviors. GranDroid utilizes detailed network-related programming logic to automatically and precisely capture the malicious network
behaviors. GranDroid enables partial static analysis to expand the analysis
scope at runtime, and uncover malicious programming logic related to dynamically executed network paths. Doing so can make our analysis approach more
sound than a traditional dynamic analysis approach. We perform an in-depth
evaluation of GranDroid in terms of the runtime performance and the efficacy
of malicious network behavior detection. We show that GranDroid can run on
real devices efficiently, achieving a high accuracy in detecting malicious network
behaviors.
3. We implement Obfusifier, a machine-learning-based malware detector that is
constructed using features from unobfuscated samples but can provide accurate
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and robust results when obfuscated samples are submitted for detection. Obfusifier generates method call graphs using static analysis. It then simplifies
method call graph by removing the user-defined methods, system-level methods
and only keeping Android API methods. This simplification process enables us to
reconstruct a graph that is obfuscation-resistant while preserving the structural
and semantic information concerning Android API usage of the original graph.
Obfusifier then extracts machine learning features from simplified graphs and
these features can resist against code obfuscation because of graph simplification.
We evaluate the detection efficacy and runtime performance Obfusifier using
both unobfuscated and obfuscated samples. The results show that Obfusifier
can handle obfuscated Android malware with high efficiency and accuracy.
Next, we describe these approaches in turn. Note that we embed prior related
work inside each approach so that we can compare and contrast their capabilities to
those of our systems after our systems have been introduced.
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Chapter 2

DroidClassifier: Efficient Adaptive Mining of
Application-Layer Header for Classifying Android Malware

Portions of this material have previously appeared in the following publication:

Z. Li, L. Sun, Q. Yan, W. Srisa-an, and Z. Chen, “Droidclassifier: Efficient
adaptive mining of application-layer header for classifying android malware,” in International Conference on Security and Privacy in Communication Systems. Springer,
2016, pp. 597–616.

In this chapter, we present DroidClassifier, a systematic framework for classifying
and detecting malicious network traffic produced by Android malicious apps. Our
work attempts to aggregate additional application traffic header information (e.g.,
method, user agent, referrer, cookies, and protocol) to derive a more meaningful
and accurate malware analysis results. As such, DroidClassifier has been designed
and constructed to consider multiple dimensions of malicious traffic information to
establish malicious network patterns. First, it uses the traffic information to create
clusters of applications. It then analyzes these application clusters (i) to identify
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whether the apps in each cluster are malicious or benign and (ii) to classify which
family the malicious apps belong to.
DroidClassifier is designed to be efficient and lightweight, and it can be integrated
into network IDS/IPS to perform mobile malware classification and detection in a
vast network. We evaluate DroidClassifier using more than six thousand Android
benign apps and malware samples, each with the corresponding collected network
traffic. In total, these malicious and benign apps generate 17,949 traffic flows. We
then use DroidClassifier to identify the malicious portions of the network traffic and
to extract the multi-field contents of the HTTP headers generated by the mobile
malware to build extensive and concrete identifiers for classifying different types
of mobile malware. Our results show that DroidClassifier can accurately classify
malicious traffic and distinguish malicious traffic from benign traffic using HTTP
header information. Experiments indicate that our framework can achieve more than
90% classification rate and detection accuracy. At the same time, it is also more
efficient than a state-of-the-art malware classification and detection approach [30].
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.1 explains why we consider
multidimensional network information to build our framework. Section 2.2 discusses
the approach used in the design of DroidClassifier, and the tuning of important
parameters in the system. DroidClassifier is evaluated in Section 2.3. Section 2.4
discusses limitations and future work. Section 2.5 describes the related work, followed
by the conclusion in Section 2.6.

2.1

Motivation

A recent report indicates that close to 5,000 Android malicious apps are created each
day [31]. The majority of these apps also use various forms of obfuscation to avoid
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detection by security analysts. However, a recent report by Symantec indicates that
Android malware authors tend to improve upon existing malware instead of creating
new ones. In fact, the study finds that more than three quarters of all Android
malware reported during the first three months of 2014 can be categorized into just
10 families [32]. As such, while malware samples belonging to a family appear to be
different in terms of source code and program structures due to obfuscation, they tend
to exhibit similar runtime behaviors.
This observation motivates the adoption of network traffic analysis to detect
malware [30, 33, 34, 35]. The initial approach is to match requested URIs or hostnames
with known malicious URIs or hostnames. However, as malware authors increase
malware complexities (e.g., making subtle changes to the behaviors or using multiple
servers as destinations to send sensitive information), the results produced by hostname
analysis tend to be inaccurate.
To overcome these subtle changes made by malware authors to avoid detection,
Aresu et al. [30] apply clustering as part of network traffic analysis to determine
malware families. Once these clusters have been identified, they extract features
from these clusters and use the extracted information to detect malware [30]. Their
experimental results indicate that their approach can yield 60% to 100% malware
detection rate. The main benefit of this approach is that it handles these subtle
changing malware behaviors as part of training by clustering the malware traffic.
However, the detection is done by analyzing each request to identify network signatures
and then matching signatures. This can be inefficient when dealing with a large traffic
amount. In addition, as these changes attempted by malware authors occur frequently,
the training process may also need to be performed frequently. As will be shown in
Section 2.3, this training process, which includes clustering, can be very costly.
We see an opportunity to deal with these changes effectively while streamlining
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the classification and detection process to make it more efficient than the approach
introduced by Aresu et al. [30]. Our proposed approach, DroidClassifier, relies on two
important insights. First, most newly created malware belongs to previously known
families. Second, clustering, as shown by Aresu et al., can effectively deal with subtle
changes made by malware authors to avoid detection. We construct DroidClassifier
to exploit previously known information about a malware sample and the family it
belongs to. This information can be easily obtained from existing security reports as
well as malware classifications provided by various malware research archives including
Android Malware Genome Project [36]. Our approach uses this information to perform
training by analyzing traffic generated by malware samples belonging to the same
family to extract most relevant features.
To deal with variations within a malware family and to improve testing efficiency,
we perform clustering of the testing traffic data and compare features of each resulting
cluster to those of each family as part of classification and detection process. Note that
the purpose of our clustering mechanism is different from the clustering mechanism
used by Aresu et al. [30], in which they apply clustering to extract useful malware
signatures. Our approach does not rely on the clustering mechanism to extract malware
traffic features. Instead, we apply clustering in the detection phase to improve the
detection efficiency by classifying and detecting malware at the cluster granularity
instead of at each individual request granularity, resulting in much less classification
and detection efforts. By relying on previously known and precise classification
information, we only extract the most relevant features from each family. This allows
us to use fewer features than the prior approach [30]. As will be shown in Section 2.3,
DroidClassifier is both effective and efficient in malware classification and detection.
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2.2

System Design

Our proposed system, DroidClassifier, is designed to achieve two objectives: (i) to
distinguish between benign and malicious traffic; and (ii) to automatically classify
malware into families based on HTTP traffic information. To accomplish these
objectives, the system employs three major components: training module, clustering
module, and malware classification and detection module.
The training module has three major functions: feature extraction, malware
database construction, and family threshold decision based on scores. After extracting
features from a collection of HTTP network traffic of malicious apps inside the training
set, the module produces a database of network patterns per family and the zscore
threshold that can be used to evaluate the maliciousness of the network traffic from
malware samples and classify them into corresponding malware families. To address
subtle behavioral changes among malware samples and to improve detection efficiency,
the clustering module is followed to collect a set of network traffic and gather similar
HTTP traffic into the same group to classify network traffic as groups.
Finally, the malware classification and detection module computes the scores and
the corresponding zscore based on HTTP traffic information of a particular traffic
cluster. If this absolute value of zscore is less than the threshold of one family, and our
system classifies the HTTP traffic into the malware family. It then evaluates whether
the HTTP traffic requests are from a particular malware family or from benign apps,
the strategy of which is similar to that of the classification module. Our Training and
Scoring mechanisms provide a quantitative measurement for malware classification
and detection. Next, we describe the training, traffic clustering, malware classification,
and malware detection process in detail.
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2.2.1

Model Training

The training process requires four steps, as shown in Figure 2.1. The first step is
collecting network traffic information of applications that can be used for training,
classification, and detection. Concerning training, the network traffic data set that
we focus on is collected from malicious apps. The second step is extracting relevant
features that can be used for training and testing. The third step is building a
malware database. Lastly, we compute the scores that can be used for classification
and detection. Next, we describe each of these steps in turn.
Network
Traffic Files

Feature
Extraction

Malware
Database

Score
Calculation

Figure 2.1: Steps taken by DroidClassifier to perform training
Collecting Network Traffic. To collect network traffic, we locate malware samples
previously classified into families. We use the real-world malware samples provided
by the Android Malware Genome Project [36] and Drebin [9] project, which classify
1,363 malware samples, making a total of 2,689 HTTP requests, into 10 families. We
randomly choose 706 samples to build the training model and the remaining 657
samples as a malware evaluation set. We also use 5,215 benign apps, generating 15,260
HTTP requests, to evaluate the detection phase. These benign apps are from the
Google Play store.
The first step of traffic collection is installing samples belonging to a family into an
Android device or a device emulator (as used in this study). We use 50% of malware
samples for training, i.e., 30% for database building and 20% for threshold calculation.
We also use 20% of benign apps for threshold calculation.
To exercise these samples, we use Monkey to randomly generate event sequences
to run each of these samples for 5 minutes to generate network traffic. We choose this
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duration because a prior work by Chen et al. [35] shows that most malware would
generate malicious traffic in the first 5 minutes.
In the third step, we use Wireshark or tcpdump, a network protocol analyzer, to
collect the network traffic information. In the last step, we generate network traffic
traces as PCAP files. After we have collected the network traffic information from a
family of malware, we repeat the process for the next family.
It is worth noting that our dataset contains several repackaged Android malware
samples. Though most of the traffic patterns generated by repackaged malware
apps and carrier apps are similar, we find that these repackaged malware samples
do generate malicious traffic. Furthermore, our samples also generate some typical
ad-library traffic, and the traffic can also add noise to our training phase. In our
implementation, we establish a “white-list” request library containing requests sending
to benign URLs and common ad-libraries. We filter out white-listed requests and
use only the remaining potential malicious traffic to train the model and perform the
detection.
Extracting Features for Model Building. We limit our investigation to HTTP
traffic because it is a commonly used protocol for network communication. There are
four types of HTTP message headers: General Header, Request Header, Response
Header, and Entity Header. Collectively, these four types of header result in 80 header
fields [37]. However, we also observe that the generated traffic uses fewer than 12 fields.
We manually analyze these header fields and choose five of them as our features. Note
that we do not rank them. If more useful headers can be obtained from a different
dataset, we may need to retrain the system.
Also, note that we utilize these features differently from the prior work [34]. In
the training phase, we make use of multiple fields and come up with a new weighted
score-based mechanism to classify HTTP traffic. Perdisci et al. [34], on the other
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hand, use clustering to generate malware signatures. In our approach, clustering is
used as an optimization to reduce the complexity of the detection/classification phase.
As such, our approach is a combination of both supervised and unsupervised learning.
By using different fields of HTTP traffic information, we, in effect, increase the
dimension of our training and testing datasets. If one of these fields is inadequate in
determining malware family, e.g., malware authors deliberately tamper one or more
fields to avoid analysis, other fields can often be used to help determine malware family,
leading to better clustering/classification results. Next, we discuss the rationale of
selecting these features and the relative importance of them.
Table 2.1: Features Extracted
Field Name
Host
Referer
Request-URI
User-Agent
Content-Type

Description
This field specifies the Internet host and port number of the resource.
This field contains URL of a page from which HTTP request originated.
The URI from the request source.
This field contains information about the user agent originating the request.
This field indicates the media type of the entity-body sent to the recipient.

• Host can be effective in detecting and classifying certain types of malware with
clear and relatively stabilized hostname fields in their HTTP traffic. Based on our
observation, most of the malware families generate HTTP traffic with only a small
number of disparate host fields.
• Referrer identifies the origination of a request. This information can introduce
privacy concerns as IMEI, SDK version, and device model; device brand can be sent
through this field, as demonstrated by DroidKungFu and FakeInstaller families.
• Request-URI can also leak sensitive information. We observe that Gappusin
family can use this field to leak device information, such as IMEI, IMSI, and OS
Version.
• User-Agent contains a text sequence containing information such as device
manufacturer, version, plugins, and toolbars installed on the browser. We observe that
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malware can use this field to send information to the Command & Control (C&C)
server.
• Content-Type can be unique for some malware families. For example, Opfake
has a unique “multipart/form-data; boundary=AaB03x" Content-Type field, which
can also be included to elevate the successful rate of malware detection.
Request-URI and Referrer are the two most important features because they contain
rich contextual information. Host and User-Agent serve as additional discernible
features to identify certain types of malware. Content-Type is the least important in
terms of identifiable capability; however, we also observe that this feature is capable
of recognizing some specific families of malware.
Although dedicated adversaries can dynamically tamper these fields to evade
detection, such adaptive behaviors may incur additional operational costs, which we
suspect is the reason why the level of adaptation is low, according to our experiments.
We defer the investigation of malware’s adaptive behaviors to future work. In addition,
employing multiple hosts can evade our detection at the cost of higher maintenance
expenses. In our current dataset, we have seen that some families use multiple hosts to
receive information, and we are still able to detect and classify them by using multiple
network features.
We also notice that these malware samples utilize C&C servers to receive leaked
information and control malicious actions. In our data set, many C&C servers are still
fully or partially functional. For fully functional servers, we observe their responses.
We notice that these responses are mainly simple acknowledgments (e.g., “200 OK”).
For the partially functional servers, we can still observe information sent by malware
samples to these servers.
Building Malware Database. Once we have identified relevant features, we extract
values for each field in each request. As an example, to build a database for the
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DroidKungFu malware family, we search all traffic trace files (PCAPs) of the all
samples belonging to this family (100 samples in this case). We then extract all values
or common longest substring patterns, in the case of Request-URI fields, of the five
relevant features. Next, we put them into lists with no duplicated values and build a
map between each key and its values.
Scoring of Malware Traffic Requests. In the training process, we assign scores
to malware traffic requests to compute the classification/detection threshold, which
we termed as training zscore computation. We need to calculate the malware zscore
range for each malware family. We use traffic from 20% of malware samples belonging
to each family for training zscore computation. For each malware family, we assign a
weight to each HTTP field to quantify different contributions of each field according
to the number of patterns the field entails since the number of patterns of a field
indicates the uncertainty of extracted patterns.
For example, the field with a single pattern is deemed as a unique field; thus, it is
considered to be a field with high contributions. In contrast, the field with several
patterns would be weighted lower. As such, we compute the total number of patterns
of each field from the malware databases to determine the weight. The following
formula illustrates the weight computation for each field: wi =

1
ti

× 100, where wi

stands for the weight for ith field, and ti is the number of patterns for the ith field
for each family in malware databases. For instance, there are 30 patterns for field
User-Agent of one malware family in malware databases, so the weight of User-Agent
is

1
30

× 100.

In terms of the Request URI field, we use a different strategy because this filed
usually contains a long string. We use the Levenshtein distance [38] to calculate the
similarity between the testing URI and each pattern. Levenshtein distance measures
the minimum number of substitutions required to change one string into the other.
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After comparing with each pattern, we choose the greatest similarity as a target
value, for example, if the similarity value is 0.76, the weight will be 0.76 × 100
or 76 for the URI field. The score can be calculated using the following equation:
P
score = N1 N
i=1 wi × mi , where wi is weight for ith field, and mi indicates whether
there is a pattern in the database that matches the field value. If there is, mi is 1;
otherwise, it is 0. Note that mi is always 1 for the URI field.
After obtaining all the field values and calculating the summation of these values,
we then divide it by the total number of fields (i.e., 5 in this case). The result is the
original score of this HTTP request. Then we need to calculate the malware zscore
range for each family. we calculate the average score and standard derivation of those
original scores which are mentioned above. Next, we calculate the absolute value of
the zscore , which represents the distance between the original score (x) and the mean
score (x̄) divided by the standard deviation (s) for each request: |zscore | =

x−x̄
s

.

Once we get the range of absolute value of zscore from all malware training requests
of each family, it is used to determine the threshold for classification and detection.
We will illustrate the threshold decision process in the following section. Algorithm 1
outlines the steps of calculating original scores from PCAP files. Note that in the
testing process, the same zscore computation is conducted to evaluate the scores of
the testing traffic requests, which we termed as testing zscore computation to avoid
confusion.

2.2.2

Malware Clustering during Testing

We automatically apply clustering analysis to all of our testing requests. We use
hierarchical clustering [39], which can build either a top-down or bottom-up tree to
determine malware clusters. The advantage of hierarchical clustering is that it is
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Algorithm 1 Calculating Request Scores From One PCAP
1: dataBase[ ] ← Database built from the previous phrase
2: pcapFile ← Each PCAP file from 20% of malware families
3: fieldNames[ ] ← Name list for all the extracted fields
4: tempScore ← 0
5: sumScore ← 0
6: avgScore ← 0
7: for each httpRequest in pcapFile do
8:
for each name in fieldNames do
9:
if httpRequest.name 6= NULL then
10:
if name 6= “requestURI” then
11:
if httpRequest.name in dataBase(name) then
12:
tempScore ← 100 {The default weight is 100}
13:
else
14:
tempScore ← 0
15:
end if
16:
else
17:
similarity ←
similarityFunction(httpRequest.requestURI, dataBase(“requestURI”))

18:
tempScore ← 100 × similarity
19:
end if
20:
end if
21:
sumScore ← sumScore + tempScore
22:
end for
23:
avgScore ← sumScore ÷ Size of fieldNames
24:
record avgScore as the original score of each httpRequest
25: end for

flexible on the proximity measure and can visualize the clustering results using a
dendrogram to help with choosing the optimal number of clusters.
In our framework, we use the single-linkage [39] clustering, which is an agglomerative
or bottom-up approach. According to Perdisci et al. [34], single-linkage hierarchical
clustering has the best performance compared to X-means [40] and complete-linkage [41]
hierarchical clustering.
Feature Extraction for Clustering. First, we need to compute distance measures
to represent similarities among HTTP requests. We extract features from URLs and
define a distance between two requests according to an algorithm proposed in [34],
except that we reduce the number of features to make our algorithm much more
efficient. In the end, we extract three types of features to perform clustering: the
domain name and port number, a path to the file, and Jaccard’s distance [42] between
parameter keys. As an example, consider the following request:
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http://www.example.com:80/path/to/myfile.html?key1=value1&key2=value2
The field, www.example.com:80, represents the first feature. The field, /path/to/
myfile.html, represents the second feature. The field, key1=value1&key2=value2,
represents the parameters, each is a key-value pair, of this request. To compute the
third feature, we calculate the Jaccard’s distance [42] between the keys. We do not use
the parameter values here because these values can be very long, and the comparison
between a large number of long strings would consume a large amount of time.
Note that in work by Perdisci et al. [34], they also use the same three features with
an addition of the fourth with is the concatenation of parameter values to calculate
the similarity of requests for desktop applications. According to [30], the length of
URL is larger for the Android malware than the desktop malware, and from our tests,
we find the time to calculate the similarity using the fourth feature is much longer
than with just three features. We also find that we can get comparable clustering
accuracy by just using the three features. As such, we exclude the fourth feature to
make our system more efficient but without sacrificing accuracy. In Section 2.3, we
show that our system is as effective as using four features [30], but is also significantly
faster.
Recall that we extract five HTTP features (see Table 2.1) to perform training.
Since these features are strings, we use the Levenshtein Distance [38] between two
strings to measure their similarity. For parameter keys, Jaccard’s distance [42] is
applied to measure the similarity. Suppose the number of HTTP requests is N , we
can get three N × N matrices based on three clustering feature sets. We calculate the
average value of the three matrices and regard this average matrix as the similarity
matrix used by the clustering algorithm.
After the clustering, we calculate the average of the |zscore | of each cluster. We
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consider requests from the same cluster as one group and use the average value to
classify this cluster.

2.2.3

Malware Classification

We use the remaining 50% of malware samples in each family as the testing set. To
determine the threshold for classification, we include traffic from 20% benign apps and
20% malware samples. We use the same method as depicted in the previous section
to calculate the original score of each benign request. However, when we calculate the
zscore range of benign apps, we use the mean score (x̄) and standard derivation(s) of the
20% malware family we have in previous sections (i.e. |zscore | =

x−x̄(malware)
s(malware)

). Then

we use the malware zscore range and benign zscore range to determine the threshold for
each malware family in an adaptive manner.
For instance, in the BaseBridge family, the absolute range of zscore varies from 1.0
to 1.3 using malicious traffic from 20% malware samples. Meanwhile, this value ranges
from 1.5 to 10 for the 20% benign apps using the BaseBridge database. As a result,
we can then set the threshold to be 1.4, which is computed by (1.3 + 1.5)/2. For the
testing traffic, if the absolute value of zscore derived by testing zscore computation is
less than the threshold, the app is classified into this BaseBridge family.

2.2.4

Malware Detection

This detection process is very similar to the clustering process. However, the testing set
has been expanded to include traffic from both malicious apps and 5,215 benign apps.
The detection phase proceeds like the classification phase. We use BaseBridge family
as an example. After extracting each HTTP request from PCAP files, we calculate
the score based on BaseBridge training database, similar to classification phase, and
if the traffic’s absolute value of zscore is higher than the BaseBridge threshold, we
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believe this traffic comes from BaseBridge family, and the traffic request is classified
as malicious. Otherwise, the traffic does not belong to the BaseBridge family. In
the end, if the traffic request is not assigned to any malware families, this request is
deemed benign.
Next, we illustrate how to calculate the detection accuracy for each malware family
through an example using the BaseBridge family. If a request is from a BaseBridge family app, and it is also identified as belonging to it, then this is true positive (TP). Otherwise, it is false negative (FN). If the request is not from BaseBridge family app, but it is
identified as belonging to it, then it is false positive (FP); otherwise, it is true negative
(TN). We then calculate the detection accuracy (DetectionAccuracy =
and malware detection rate (M alware Detection Rate =

T P +T N
)
T P +T N +F N +F P

SU M (T P )
)
SU M (F N )+SU M (T P )

of each

family.

2.3

Evaluation

We evaluate the malware classification performance of DroidClassifier. We use 30% of
the malware samples for database building, 20% of both malware and benign apps
for threshold calculation. We set up the testing set to use the remaining 50% of the
malware samples and 80% of benign apps. Specifically, we evaluate the following
performance aspects of DroidClassifier system.
1. We evaluate classification effectiveness of DroidClassifier to classify malicious
apps into different families of malware. We present the performance in terms of
detection accuracy, TPR (True Positive Rate), TNR (True Negative Rate), and
F-Measure. Our evaluation experiments using different numbers of clusters to
determine which one yields the most accurate classification result.
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2. We evaluate the malware detection effectiveness of DroidClassifier using only
malware samples as the training and testing sets. We only focus on how
well DroidClassifier correctly detects malware. The detection performance is
represented by detection accuracy.
3. We evaluate the influence of clustering on malware detection effectiveness by
comparing the detection rates between the best case in DroidClassifier when the
number of cluster is 1000, and DroidClassifier without clustering process.
4. We compare our classification effectiveness with results of other approaches. We
also compare the efficiency of DroidClassifier with a similar clustering system [30].
Our dataset consists of 1,363 malicious apps, and our benign apps are downloaded
from multiple popular app markets by app crawler. Each downloaded app is sent
to VirusTotal for initial screening. The app is added to our normal app set only
if the test result is benign. Eventually, we get a normal app set of 5,215 samples
belonging to 24 families. We also collect a large amount of traffic data by an automatic
mobile traffic collection system, similar to the system described in [35] to evaluate
the classification/detection performance of DroidClassifier. In the end, we get
500.4 MB of network traffic data generated by malware samples in total, out of which
we extract 18.1 MB of malicious behavior traffic for training purposes. Similarly, we
collect 2.15 GB of data generated by normal apps for model training and testing.
2.3.1

Malware Classification Effectiveness Across Different Cluster Numbers

In our experiment, we investigate the sensitivity of our approach to the number of
clusters. Therefore, we strategically adjust the number of clusters to find the optimal
number that is used to classify malware in the testing data. To do so, we evaluate 13
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Table 2.2:
Classification Result with Different Number of Clusters (
TPR=TP/(TP+FN); TNR=TN/(TN+FP) )
Number of
Clusters
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000

TPR
73.90%
60.70%
60.70%
70.24%
92.39%
90.70%
90.76%
90.76%
89.08%
89.08%
89.08%
88.75%
88.12%

TNR
46.59%
66.45%
66.61%
91.39%
94.80%
94.45%
94.42%
93.79%
93.15%
93.11%
93.06%
92.45%
93.02%

Detection_Accuracy
46.95%
66.34%
66.52%
91.12%
94.66%
94.30%
94.28%
93.64%
93.01%
92.97%
92.92%
92.30%
92.79%

different numbers of clusters for the whole dataset, ranging from 200 to 7000 clusters.
Table 2.2 shows the classification results using 13 different numbers of clusters. When
we increase the number of clusters from 200 to 1000, the detection accuracy also
improves from 46.95% to 94.66%, respectively. However, using more than 1000 clusters
does not improve accuracy. As such, using 1000 clusters is optimal for our dataset. In
this setting, but without using DroidKungfu and Gappusin, the two families which
are previously known to be hard to detect and classify [9], DroidClassifier achieves
TPR of 92.39% and TNR of 94.80%, respectively. With these two families, our TPR
and TNR still yield 89.90% and 87.60%, respectively.

2.3.2

Detection Effectiveness Per Family

Next, we further decompose our analysis to determine the effectiveness of DroidClassifier by evaluating our effectiveness metrics per malware family. As shown
in Table 2.3, in four out of ten families, our system can achieve more than 90% in
F-Measure, meaning that it can accurately classify malicious family as it detects more
true positives and true negatives than false positives and false negatives. As the
table reports, our system yields accurate classification results in BaseBridge, FakeDoc,
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Table 2.3: Malware Classification Performance with 1000 Clusters ( F_Measure =
2TP / (2TP + FP + FN) )
FamilyName

TP

FN

TN

FP

BaseBridge
DroidKungFu
FakeDoc
FakeInstaller
FakeRun
Gappusin
Iconosys
MobileTx
Opfake
Plankton

351
104 11994
44
286
74
7306
4827
229
1
12263
0
73
1
11968
451
70
6
11890
527
66
16
7170
5241
17
4
8465
4007
227
1
12265
0
93
4
12396
0
1025
51
11279
138
AVG Results
AVG Results w/o DroidKungFu & Gappusin

TPR
(%)
77.14
79.44
99.57
98.65
92.11
80.49
80.95
99.56
95.88
95.26
89.90
92.39

TNR
(%)
99.63
60.22
100.00
96.37
95.76
57.77
67.87
100.00
100.00
98.79
87.64
94.80

Detection
Accuracy (%)
98.82
60.77
99.99
96.38
95.73
57.92
67.89
99.99
99.97
98.49
87.60
94.66

F_Measure
(%)
82.59
10.45
99.78
24.41
20.8
2.45
0.84
99.78
97.89
91.56
53.06
64.71

FakeInstaller, FakeRun, MobileTx, Opfake, and Plankton. Specifically, FakeDoc and
MobileTx show above 99% in F-measure, which means it almost detect everything
correctly in these two families. However, DroidKungFu, FakeInstaller, FakeRun,
Gappusin, and Iconosys show very low F-measure.
Discussion. Our system cannot accurately classify these three families (i.e. DroidKungFu, Gappusin, and Iconosys) due to two main reasons. First, the amounts of
network traffic for these families are too small. For example, we only have 38 applications in Iconosys family, and among these, only 19 applications produce network
traffic information. We plan to extend the traffic collection time to address this issue
in future works.
Second, the malware samples in DroidKungFu and Gappusin families produce a
large amount of traffic information that shares similar patterns with that of other
families and can lead to ambiguity. We also cross-reference our results with those
reported by Drebin [9]. Their results also confirm our observation as their approach
can only achieve less than 50% detection accuracy, which is even lower than that
achieved by our system. This is the main reason why we report our result in Table 2.5
by excluding DroidKungFu and Gappusin.
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Table 2.4: Classification Performance without Clustering Procedure
FamilyName
BaseBridge
DroidKungFu
FakeDoc
FakeInstaller
FakeRun
Gappusin
Iconosys
MobileTx
Opfake
Plankton

TP

FN

TN

FP

437
18
12038
0
286
74
2195
9938
229
1
12263
0
73
1
12419
0
75
1
11876
541
66
16
2914
9497
20
1
11304
1168
227
1
12265
0
84
13
12396
0
1049
27
11302
115
AVG Results
AVG Results w/o DroidKungFu & Gappusin

2.3.3

TPR
(%)
96.04
79.44
99.57
98.65
98.68
80.49
95.24
99.56
86.60
97.49
93.18
96.48

TNR
(%)
100.00
18.09
100.00
100.00
95.64
23.48
90.64
100.00
100.00
98.99
82.68
98.16

Detection
Accuracy (%)
99.86
19.86
99.99
99.99
95.66
23.85
90.64
99.99
99.90
98.86
82.86
98.11

F_Measure
(%)
97.98
5.4
99.78
99.32
21.68
1.37
3.31
99.78
92.82
93.66
61.51
76.04

Comparing Detection Effectiveness of Clustering versus Non-Clustering

In Table 2.4, we report the detection results when clustering is not performed (i.e.,
we configure our system to have a cluster for each request). As shown in the table,
the detection accuracy without clustering is significantly worse than those with
clustering for DroidKungFu and Gappusin. In DroidKungFu family, the detection
accuracy decreases from 60.77% to 19.86% by eliminating the clustering procedure. In
Gappusin family, the detection accuracy decreases from 57.92% to 23.85%. However,
after removing these two families, it shows better average detection accuracy than
DroidClassifier with the clustering procedure. The detection accuracy of the Iconosys
family increases from 67.89% to 90.64% by removing the clustering procedure.
Discussion. Upon further investigation of the network traffic information, we uncover
that the network traffic generated by many benign applications and that of the Iconosys
family are very similar. As such, many benign network traffic flows are included with
malicious traffic flows as part of the clustering process. However, the overall detection
rate including two worst cases (i.e. AVG results in Table 2.3 and 2.4) shows that
DroidClassifier with clustering is more accurate than DroidClassifier without clustering.
In addition, the clustering mechanism enables the cluster-level classification, which
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classifies malware as a group, while the mechanism without clustering classifies malware
individually. This makes DroidClassifier with clustering much more efficient than the
mechanism without clustering, in terms of system processing time.

2.3.4

Comparing Performance with Other Mobile Malware Detectors

In this section, we compare our detection results with other malware detection
approaches, including Drebin, PermissionClassifier, Aresu et al. [30], and Afonso et
al. [43].
• Drebin [9] is an approach that detects malware by combining static analysis of
permissions and APIs with machine learning. It utilizes Support Vector Machine
(SVM) algorithm to classify malware data set.
• PermissionClassifier, on the other hand, uses only permission as the features
to perform malware detection. During the implementation, we use the same
malicious applications used to evaluate Drebin. Then we use Apktool [44] to find
the permissions called by each application. We randomly separate the data set
as training and testing set. SVM classification approach is employed to perform
malware classification.
• Aresu et. al [30] extract malware signatures by clustering HTTP traffic, and
they use these signatures to detect malware. We implement their clustering
method, and compare the result with that produced by our system.
• Afonso et al. [43] develop a machine learning system that detects Android
malicious apps by using dynamic information from system calls and Android
API functions. They employ a different dynamic way to detect malware and
also use Android Malware Genome Project [36] as the dataset.
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Table 2.5 reports the results of our evaluation. Drebin uses more features than
PermissionClassifier, including API calls and network addresses. As a result, Drebin
outperforms PermissionClassifier in detection accuracy. We also compare the results
of our system against those of 10 existing anti-virus scanners [9]: AntiVir, AVG,
BitDefender, ClamAV, ESET, F-Secure, Kaspersky, McAfee, Panda, Sophos. We
report the minimum, maximum, and average detection rate of these 10 virus scanners
in columns 5 to 7 (AV1 – AV10).
Table 2.5: Detection Rates of DroidClassfier and Ten Anti-Virus Scanners
Method
Full Dataset

Droid
Classifier
94.33%

Permission
Classifier
89.30%

Drebin
93.90%

Aresu
et al.
60% - 100%

Afonso
et al.
96.82%

Min
3.99%

AV1 – AV10
Max
Avg.
96.41% 61.25%

The most time-consuming part of the hierarchical clustering is the calculation
of the similarity matrix. Aresu et. al [30] use one more feature, the aggregation of
values in the Request-URI field, to build their clustering system. We implement their
method and evaluate the time to compute the similarity matrix. We then compare
their time consumption for matrix computation of each malware family with that of
DroidClassifier and report the result in Table 2.6. For BaseBridge, DroidKungFu,
FakeDoc, and Gappusin, our approach incurs 60% to 100% less time than their
approach while yielding over 94% detection rate. For other families, the time is about
the same. This is because those families do not generate traffic with the Request-URI
field.
Drebin and PermissionClassifier are the state-of-the-art malware detection system
with high detection accuracy. Our approach is a dynamic-analysis based approach. In
the literature, as far as we know, there is a lack of comparative work using dynamic
analysis on a large malware dataset to evaluate malware detection accuracy. Therefore,
though Drebin and PermissionClassifier use static analysis features, we compare
against them in terms of malware detection rate to prove the detection accuracy of
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Table 2.6: Time Comparison of Matrix Calculation (Experiments run on Apple
MacBook Pro with 2.8GHz Intel Core i7 and 16G memory)
Family Name

Number of Requests

Plankton
BaseBridge
DroidKungFu
FakeDoc
Opfake
FakeInstaller
FakeRun
Gappusin
MobileTx
Iconosys

1075
454
359
229
96
73
75
81
227
20

DroidClassifier
(seconds)
361
37
86
9
8
9
10
11
61
9

Aresu et al.
(seconds)
361
10230
3520
820
8
9
10
264
61
9

DroidClassifier. As our proposed classifier is a network-traffic based classifier, the
main advantage of our classifier is that we can deploy our system on gateway routers
instead of end-user devices.
Work by Aresu et al. uses clustering to extract signatures to detect malware.
We have emphasized the difference between our work and Aresu before. In terms
of comparison, we compare the detection rate and time cost with them. Our work
can achieve over 90% detection rate. Even though the purpose of our clustering is
different, we can still compare the clustering efficiency. For BaseBridge, DroidKungFu,
FakeDoc, and Gappusin, our approach, in terms of clustering time, is more efficient
than their approach by 60% to 100%.
Work by Afonso et al. [43] can achieve the average detection accuracy of 96.82%.
So far, the preliminary investigation of detection effectiveness already indicates that
our system can achieve nearly the same accuracy. Unlike their approach, our system
can also classify samples into different families, which is essential, as repackaging is
a common form to develop malware. Their approach still requires that a malware
sample executes completely. In the case that it does not (e.g., interrupted connection
with a C&C server or premature termination due to detection of malware analysis
environments), their system cannot perform detection. However, our network traffic-
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based system can handle partial execution as long as the malware attempts to send
sensitive information. The presence of our system is also harder to detect as it captures
the traffic on the router side, preventing specific malware samples from prematurely
terminating execution to avoid analysis.

2.4

Discussion

In this chapter, we use HTTP header information to help classify and detect malware.
However, our current implementation does not handle encrypted requests through
HTTPS protocol. To handle such type of requests in the future, we may need to
work closely with runtime systems to capture information before encryption, or use
on-device software such as Haystack [45] to decrypt HTTPs traffic.
Our system also expects a sufficient number of requests in the training set. As
shown in families such as Iconosys, insufficient data used during training can cause the
system to classify malware and benign samples incorrectly. Furthermore, to generate
network traffic information, our approach, similar to work by Afonso et al. [43], relies
on Monkey to generate sufficient traffic. However, events triggered by Monkey tool
are random, and therefore, may not replicate real-world events, especially in the
case that complex event sequences are needed to trigger malicious behaviors. In
such scenarios, malicious network traffic may not be generated. Creating complex
event sequences is still a major research challenge in the area of testing GUI- and
event-based applications. To address this issue in the future, we plan to use more
sophisticated event sequence generation approaches to including GUI ripping and
symbolic or concolic execution. [46]. We will also evaluate the minimum number of
traffic requests that are required to induce good classification performance in future
works.
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Currently, our framework can only detect new samples from known families if
they happen to share previously modeled behaviors. For sample requests from totally
unknown malware samples, our framework can put all these similar requests into
a cluster. This can help analysts to isolate these samples and simplify the manual
analysis process. We also plan to extract other features beyond application-layer header
information. For example, we may want to focus on the packet’s payload that may
contain more interesting information, such as C&C instructions and sensitive data. We
can also combine the network traffic information with other unique features, including
permission and program structures such as data-flow and control-flow information.
Similar to existing approaches, our approach can still fail against determined
adversaries who try to avoid our classification approach. For example, an adversary
can develop advanced techniques to change their features without affecting their
malicious behaviors dynamically. Currently, machine-learning-based detection systems
suffer from this problem [47]. We need to consider how adversaries may adapt to our
classifiers and develop better mobile malware classification and detection strategies.
We are in the process of collecting newer malware samples to evaluate our system
further. We anticipate that newer malware samples may utilize more complex interactions with C&C servers. In this case, we expect more meaningful network behaviors
that our system can exploit to detect and classify these emerging-malware samples.
Lastly, our system is lightweight because it can be installed on the router to detect
malicious apps automatically. The system is efficient because our approach classifies
and detects malware at the cluster granularity instead of at each individual request
granularity, resulting in much less classification and detection efforts. As future work,
we will experiment with deployments of DroidClassifier in a real-world setting.
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2.5

Related Work

Network Traffic Analysis has been used to monitor runtime behaviors by exercising
targeted applications to observe app activities and collect relevant data to help with
analysis of runtime behaviors [21, 48, 49, 50, 51]. Information can be gathered at ISP
level or by employing proxy servers and emulators. Our approach also collects network
traffic by executing apps in device emulators. The collected traffic information can be
analyzed for leakage of sensitive information [12, 52], used for classification based on
network behaviors [34], or exploited to detect malware automatically [33, 35, 53].
Supervised and unsupervised learning approaches are then used to help with
detecting [54,55,56] and classifying desktop malware [34,57] based on collected network
traffic. Recently, there have been several efforts that use network traffic analysis and
machine learning to detect mobile malware. Shabtai et al. [58] present a Host-based
Android machine learning malware detection system to target the repackaging attacks.
They conclude that deviations of some benign behaviors can be regarded as malicious
ones. Narudin et al. [59] come up with a TCP/HTTP based malware detection system.
They extracted basic information (e.g., IP address), content-based, time-based, and
connection-based features to build the detection system. Their approach can only
determine if an app is malicious or not, and they cannot classify malware to different
families.
FIRMA [60] is a tool that clusters unlabeled malware samples according to network
traces. It produces network signatures for each malware family for detection. Anshul
et al. [53] propose a malware detection system using network traffic. They extract
statistical features of malware traffic, and select decision trees as a classifier to build
their system. Their system can only judge whether an app is malicious or not. Our
system, however, can identify the family of malware.
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Aresu et al. [30] create malware clusters using traffic and extract signatures from
clusters to detect malware. Our work is different from their approach in that we extract
malware patterns from existing families by analyzing HTTP traffic and determining
scores to help with malware classification and detection. To make our system more
efficient, we then form clusters of testing traffics to reduce the number of test cases
(each cluster is a test case) that must be evaluated. This allows our approach to be
more efficient than the prior effort that analyzes each testing traffic trace.

2.6

Conclusion

In this chapter, we introduce DroidClassifier, a malware classification and detection
approach that utilizes multidimensional application-layer data from network traffic
information. DroidClassifier integrates clustering and classification frame to take
into account disparate and unique characteristics of different mobile malware families.
Our study includes over 1,300 malware samples and 5,000 benign apps. We find that
DroidClassifier successfully identifies over 90% of different families of malware with
94.33% accuracy on average. Meanwhile, it is also more efficient than state-of-the-art
approaches to perform Android malware classification and detection based on network
traffic. We envision DroidClassifier to be applied in network management to control
mobile malware infections in a vast network.

32

Chapter 3

GranDroid: Graph-based Detection of Malicious Network
Behaviors in Android Applications

Portions of this material have previously appeared in the following publication:

Z. Li, J. Sun, Q. Yan, W. Srisa-an, and S. Bachala, “Grandroid: Graph-based
detection of malicious network behaviors in android applications,” in International
Conference on Security and Privacy in Communication Systems. Springer, 2018, pp.
264–280.

In this chapter, we set our research goal to enhance the capability of hybrid
analysis and evaluate if it can provide sufficiently rich context information in detecting
malware’s malicious network behaviors on real devices within a specific time budget.
Analyzing apps on real devices mitigates the evasion attacks by sophisticated malware
that determines its attacking strategy based on its running environment. However,
the challenge lies in need of lowering the analysis overhead incurred on resourceconstrained mobile devices. Also, we aim at capturing additional relevant networkrelated programming logic by using dynamic analysis, so that we can avoid any
wasteful efforts in distilling information from apps. We then evaluate the effectiveness
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of the dynamically generated information in detecting malicious network behaviors of
mobile malware.
To achieve this research goal, we introduce GranDroid, a graph-based malicious
network behavior detection system. GranDroid has been implemented as a tool
built on Jitana, a high-performance hybrid program analysis framework [61]. We
extract four network-related features from the network-related paths and subpaths
that incorporate network methods, statistic features of each subpath, and statistic
features on the sizes of newly-generated files during the dynamic analysis. These
features uniquely capture the programming logic that leads to malicious network
behaviors. We then apply different types of machine learning algorithms to build
models for detecting malicious network behaviors.
We evaluate GranDroid using 1, 500 benign and 1, 500 malicious apps collected recently, and run these apps on real devices (i.e., Asus Nexus 7 tablets) using
event sequences generated by UIAutomator1 . Our evaluation results indicate that
GranDroid can achieve high detection performance with 93.2% F-measure.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. We provide a motivating example for
this work in Section 3.1. We present system design and implementation in Section 3.2.
We report our evaluation results in Section 3.3 and discuss the ramifications of the
reported results in Section 3.4. We describe related work in Section 3.5 and conclude
this chapter in Section 3.6.

3.1

Motivation

Bouncer, the vetting system used by Google, can be bypassed by either delaying
enacting the malicious behaviors or not enacting the malicious behaviors when the app
1

available from: https://developer.android.com/training/testing/ui-automator.html
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is running on an emulator instead of a real device. Figure 3.1 illustrates a code snippet
from Android.Feiwo adware [62], a malicious advertisement library that leaks user’s
private information including device information (e.g., IMEI) and device location. The
Malcode method checks fake device ID or fake model to determine whether the app is
running on an emulator.
1: public static Malcode(android.content.Context c) {
2:
...
3:
v0 = c.getSystemService("phone").getDeviceId();
4.
if (v0 == 0 || v0.equals("000000000000000") == 0) {
5.
if ((android.os.Build.MODEL.equals("sdk") == 0) &&
(android.os.Build.MODEL.equals("google_sdk") == 0)) {
6:
server = http.connect (server A);}
7:
else{
8:
server = http.connect (server B); }}
9:
else{
10:
server = http.connect (server B);}
11:
// Send message to server through network interface
12:
...}

Figure 3.1: Android.Feiwo Adware Example
In this example, if the app is being vetted through a system like Bouncer, it
would be running on an emulator that matches the conditions in Lines 4 and 5. As
a result, it will then connect to a benign server, i.e., server A, which serves benign
downloadable advertisement objects (i.e., Line 6). However, if the app is running on
a real device, it will make a connection to a malicious server, i.e., server B, which
serves malicious components disguised as advertisements (i.e., Lines 8 and 10). An
emulator-based vetting system then classifies this app as benign since the application
never exhibits any malicious network behaviors.
For static analysis approaches, the amount of time to analyze this app can vary
based on the complexity of code. Furthermore, there are cases when static analysis
cannot provide conclusive results as some of the input values may not be known at the
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analysis time (e.g., the location of server B can be read in from an external file). This
would require additional dynamic analysis to verify the analysis results. Therefore,
using static analysis can be quite challenging for security analysts if each app must be
vetted within a small time budget (e.g., a few minutes).
Our proposed approach attempts to achieve the best of both static and dynamic
approaches. Specifically, we propose to find suspicious code locations by using dynamic
analysis to identify executable components. It then supplements dynamic analysis
results with static analysis of these executed components to uncover more execution
paths. Finally, it uses a machine learning classifier to quickly determine if the app has
malicious network behaviors.
For example, when we use our approach to analyze Malcode, it would first run the
app for a fixed amount of time. While the app is running, our hybrid analysis engine
pulls all the loaded classes (including any of its methods that have been executed
and any classes loaded through the Java reflection mechanism) and incrementally
analyzes all methods in each class to identify if there are paths in an app’s call graph
that contain targeted or suspicious network activities. Despite the malware’s effort in
hiding the malicious paths, our system would be able to identify the executed path
that includes the network related API calls on Lines 6, 8 and 10. These paths are
then decomposed into subpaths and submitted to our classifier for malicious pattern
identification.
There are two notable points in this example. First, our approach can analyze more
information within a given time budget than using dynamic analysis alone. This would
allow vetting techniques including Bouncer to achieve a higher precision without
extending the analysis budget. Second, unlike existing approaches such as DroidSIFT,
which only considers APIs invoked in the application code [63], our approach also
retrieves low level platform and system APIs that are necessary to perform the targeted
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actions. This allows our approach to build longer and more comprehensive paths,
leading to more relevant information that can further improve detection precision. In
the following section, we describe the design and implementation of GranDroid in
detail.

3.2

System Design

We now describe the architectural overview of our proposed system, which operates
in three phases: graph generation, feature extraction, and malicious network behavior
detection, as shown in Figure 3.2. Next, we describe each phase in turn.

TCPDUMP
UI
Automator
JITANA

1. Graph Generation

Graphs
SNPs
Subpaths

Feature
Extraction
Tool

Features
Subpath: Existence,
Frequency, Statistic
File: Statistic

Features
as
Numeric
Vectors

2. Feature Extraction

SVM,
Decision Tree,
Random Forest,

3. Detection

Figure 3.2: System Architecture
3.2.1

Graph Generation

GranDroid detects malicious network behaviors by analyzing program contexts
based on system-level graphs. As illustrated in Figure 3.2, the process to generate the
necessary graphs involves three existing tools and an actual device or an emulator (we
used an actual device in this case). First, we install both malicious and benign apps
with known networking capability on several Nexus 7 tablets. Next, we select malware
samples and benign apps that can be exercised and can produce network traffic. We
discard incomplete malware samples and the ones that produce zero network traffic,
as GranDroid currently focuses on detecting malicious network behaviors. However,
GranDroid can be extended to cover other types of malware (e.g., those that corrupt
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files). For future work, we plan to show that our graph-based approach is also effective
for detecting other types of malicious behaviors.
Next, we use UIAutomator to generate event sequences to exercise these apps.
The tablet is also connected to a workstation running TCPDump to capture network
traffic information and Jitana [61], a high-performance hybrid program analysis tool
to perform on-the-fly program analysis. Because it is possible that UIAutomator
cannot generate the necessary event sequences to exercise components in an app
that generates network traffic, we also use TCPDump to verify that the apps we
investigate indeed generate network traffic. If UIAutomator fails to generate event
sequences for an app that is known to produce network traffic, that particular app is
subsequently discarded.
While UIAutomator exercises these apps installed on a tablet, we use Jitana to
concurrently analyze loaded classes to generate three types of graphs: classloader, class,
and method call graphs that our technique utilizes. Jitana can analyze application
code, third party library code, framework code (including implementations of various
Android APIs), and underlying system code. Jitana performs analysis by off-loading
its dynamic analysis effort to a workstation to save the runtime overhead. It periodically
communicates with the tablet to pull classes that have been loaded as a program runs.
Once these classes have been pulled, Jitana analyzes these classes to uncover all
methods and then generates the method call graph for the app. As such, we are able
to run Jitana and TCPDump simultaneously, allowing the data collection process to
be completed within one run. For the apps that we cannot observe network traffic,
we also discard their generated graphs. Next, we provide the basic description of the
three types of graphs used in GranDroid.
Class Loader Graph and Class Graph. A Class Loader Graph of an app includes
all class loaders called when running an app. Direct edges show the inheritance
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Figure 3.3: Method Graph
relationship between two class loaders. System class loaders are parents of application
class loaders. A Class Graph shows relationships among all classes. The important
information that these graphs provide includes the ownership, relationship between
methods, classes, and the app that these classes belong to (based on the class loader
information). Such information is particularly useful for identifying paths and subpaths
as it can help resolving ambiguity when multiple methods belonging to different classes
share the same name and method’s signature. Both Class Loader Graph and Class
Graph are used to generate size information feature for machine learning classification.
Method Graph. Our system detects malicious network behaviors by exploring the
invoking relationship of methods in the Method Graph. As shown in Figure 3.3, blocks
represent methods, and edges indicate invoking relationships among methods. Each
block contains the name of the method, its modifiers, and the class name which this
method belongs to. Sensitive Network Paths (SNPs) are defined as paths that contain
network-related APIs. We generate SNPs from the method graph of each app.
Note that these dynamically generated graphs are determined by the event sequences that exercise each app. As such, they reflect the runtime behavior of an app.
Another useful information contained in these graphs includes the specific Android
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Figure 3.5: Subpath Generation
APIs provided by Google and used by each app. We observe that detecting an actual
malicious act often boils down to detecting critical Android APIs that enable malicious
behaviors. For example, if a malicious app tries to steal users’ private information by
sending it through the Internet, network-related APIs must be used to commit this
malicious act. In addition to network-related APIs, there are also other system-level
and user-defined methods that can be exploited by malware authors. Jitana can
capture the invocations of these APIs and any lower-level APIs that can help with
identifying SNPs and their subpaths formed by these sensitive method invocations.
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The information can be extracted from the Method Graph of each app. Next, we
describe the process of generating SNPs and the corresponding subpaths.
Sensitive Network Path (SNP) Generation. An SNP (a path related to network
behavior) can be used to determine if an app exhibits malicious network behaviors.
To generate SNPs, we extract all the network-related Android APIs provided by
Google, and network-related APIs from third-party HTTP libraries, such as Volley
[64], Okhttp [65], Picasso [66], and Android Asynchronous Http Client [67]. In
the Method Graph, we consider all nodes whose in-degree is zero as sources and
all network-related method nodes as destinations. GranDroid generates SNPs
from sources to destinations via depth-first search (DFS). Each SNP contains all the
methods (nodes) from the program entry points to network-related destinations.
Figure 3.4 illustrates the SNP Generation. There are two sources (Node 1 and
Node 2, marked as red) and two destinations (Node 7 and Node 11, marked as green)
in the graph. Node 1 and Node 2 are sources as no edges are flowing into them.
Node 7 and Node 11 are destinations as they are network-related methods. Starting
from Node 1, Node 2, and ending with Node 7, Node 11, six SNPs can be identified:
1→3→7, 1→4→7, 1→4→8→11, 1→5→9→11, 2→5→9→11 and 2→6→9→11.
SNP preserves the order of methods, and we believe that paths from malware have
different patterns compared to those from benign apps. In the following section, we
will explain our strategies in extracting features from SNP.
Sensitive Network Subpath (SNS) Generation. To extract features, we also
need to extract all the subpaths from each SNP. These subpaths are regarded as
patterns for machine learning classification. In our system, we only use the starting
node and the ending node to indicate subpath and ignore all the nodes between them.
Figure 3.5 shows the process of generating subpaths. For instance, there is a SNP:
1→4→8→11, and all the subpaths are 1→4, 4→8, 8→11, 1→8, 4→11, 1→11. We
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ignore the intermediate nodes because these subpaths imply the intermediate nodes.
For example, 1→4, 4→8, and 8→11 can imply that 4 and 8 are between 1 and 11.
These subpaths are then converted into numeric vectors in the Feature Extraction
phase.

3.2.2

Feature Extraction

We now describe the features that our system extracts from the information generated
by the Graph Generation phase. Our features come from the generated graphs, paths,
and subpaths. We also consider the amount of the generated features for each malware
sample as another feature. To quantify this, we use the size of the file that stores the
feature of each app. File size provides a good approximation of the volume of each
generated feature.
Subpath Existence Feature (F1). We extract all the SNSs for each malicious app
in the training set and build a database to store them. We order these subpaths by
their names and form a Boolean vector from these subpaths. For each sample in the
testing set, GranDroid generates the SNSs for each app, and we check whether
these subpaths match any paths stored in the database. A matching subpath indicates
a malicious pattern, and the corresponding bit in the Boolean vector is set to 1.
Otherwise, the corresponding bit remains at 0. Even though our training set contains
more than 20,000 subpaths, the vectorization process can be efficient when a database
management system (e.g., SQLite) is used. This subpath vector provides an enhanced
feature for classification. The subpaths reflect the programming logic of malware, and
therefore, GranDroid inherently captures the relationship among methods in the
network-related paths.
Subpath Frequency Feature (F2). As mentioned above, Subpath Existence
Feature is extracted to form a numeric vector based on network subpaths of malware
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in the training set. To generate Subpath Existence Feature, we check if the identified
subpath exists in the database or not. However, in generating Subpath Frequency
Feature, we count how many times the subpath appears for each sample.
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Figure 3.6: Subpath Frequency Feature
To do so, we use both SNP and SNS information. As shown in Figure 3.6, we
have two SNPs of an app: 1→4→7 and 1→4→8→11. Subpath 1→4 appears in both
sensitive paths, and therefore the frequency of this subpath is 2. Instead of marking
1/0 to build Subpath Existence Feature, we mark the frequency value in the vector
position. Intuitively, the frequency of the subpaths can be useful in representing the
usage pattern of malicious programming logic.
Path Statistic Feature (F3). We collect several statistic features for each Android
app from its Network Sensitive Path. We use nine statistical features that include
the lengths of the longest and short paths, the average path length, the number of
paths, the number of classes and methods in all paths, the sum of lengths of all paths,
and the average numbers of classes and methods per path. We observe that these
statistical features can represent malicious network behaviors. For instance, we notice
that malware that conducts malicious network behaviors tends to generate shorter
and fewer paths than benign apps. These features form a numeric vector to reflect

43
the unique characteristics of malicious network behaviors that can further represent
these paths in greater detail.
File Statistic Feature (F4). In the previous sections, we discuss Method Graph,
Class Graph, ClassLoader Graph generated by Jitana. We also present our strategy to
generate the SNP, along with methods to extract Subpath Existence Feature, Subpath
Frequency Feature, and Path Statistic Feature based on Sensitive Network Path. For
each app, we save all of these graphs, paths, and feature information into separate
files. We hypothesize that the size of these files can be used to form another numeric
feature vector for our machine-learning-based detection system. This is because the
file size accurately reflects the amount of generated information that can provide some
insight into the complexity of these network paths (e.g., the numbers of API calls and
the number of paths). In the end, the attributes we use to form the File Statistic
Feature for each app include the size of each graph (method graph, class graph, and
class-loader graph) and each generated feature (SNPs, subpaths, subpath existence,
subpath frequency, and path statistics).

3.2.3

Detection

In the Detection phase, we apply three well-recognized machine learning algorithms
to determine if an Android app has malicious network behaviors automatically.
Our system utilizes four different features (F1 - F4), as previously mentioned.
Intuitively, we consider that each of the four feature sets can reflect malicious network
behaviors in some specific patterns. For example, in terms of Subpath Existence
Feature, one subpath alone or several subpaths appear together might be the pattern
to identify malicious behaviors. For Subpath Frequency Feature, we not only consider
the existence of subpaths but also how many times each subpath appears in all the
paths for each app. The frequency of subpaths might be helpful to construct more
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meaningful program logic patterns because the subpaths with higher frequency might
be critical to identify malicious behaviors. Regarding Path Statistic Feature, for
example, we observed that paths from malware are usually shorter than paths from
benign apps so that the path statistic information might improve the accuracy of the
machine learning-based system. The size of files where we store graphs and features
can also help build our detection system. For example, we observe that the size of the
Method Graph from malware is usually smaller than benign apps, so we gather these
file size information and form a File Statistic Feature.
To get the best detection result, we need to mine the dependencies of features
within each feature set and the relationship between different feature sets. We discussed
approaches to convert feature set F1, F2, F3, and F4 into a numeric vector in the
previous section. We can simply unionize or aggregate different feature sets into a
combined feature set. For example, we can define a new feature set by combining F3
and F4.
Even though there are many supervised learning algorithms to use, we only apply
three widely adopted algorithms to build malware detectors. Support Vector Machine
(SVM) is commonly used for binary classification based on hyperplane. Decision Tree
uses a tree-like structure to make decisions. Random Forest performs classification
based on multiple decision trees [68, 69, 70].

3.3

Evaluation

We present the results of our empirical evaluation of GranDroid. We first explain
the process of collecting our experimental objects. Next, we report our detection
results by using different sets of features. We also compare our methods with other
related approaches. Lastly, we report the runtime performance of GranDroid.
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3.3.1

Data Collection

Initially, our dataset consists of 20,795 apps from APKPure [71] collected from January
2017 to March 2017. We also downloaded 24,317 malware samples from VirusShare [72].
Note that these samples are newer than those from the Android Genome Project [36],
an accessible malware repository that was also used by DroidMiner.
To prevent dataset pollution, we cross-check all our apps from APKPure with
VirusTotal. The cross-checking process took 29 days. Some of these benign apps
might be identified as malicious by some of the anti-virus scanners, such as AVG,
BitDefender, F-Secure, and Kaspersky, and we remove those apps from benign dataset.
This is done to ensure that the benign dataset is free of contaminants. After the scan
process by VirusTotal, only 11,238 apps from APKPure are considered as benign apps.
The malicious samples from the VirusShare have been identified as malicious, and
these samples form our malicious dataset.
Next, we need to select apps with network behaviors. We use UIAutomator
to build test cases so that each app can perform interactions with the system app.
We then measure the code coverage by first statically determining the total number
of SNPs. After that, we determine the number of SNPs that UIAutomator can
execute. The ratio of dynamic SNPs and static SNPs represents the code coverage. In
this study, our average code coverage for all the apps is 22%.
When we execute each app, we also run TCPDUMP packet analyzer in the table
to capture the network traffic information and save it as a PCAP file. Usually,
malware which conducts malicious network behaviors regularly sends and receives
HTTP packets. As such, we only select apps by mainly focusing on their HTTP
traffic in the PCAP files. Initially, we have 11,238 benign apps and 24,317 malicious
apps. After removing apps without HTTP traffic, only 1,725 malicious apps and 1,625
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benign apps remain. To have a balanced dataset, we randomly select 1,500 benign
and 1,500 malicious apps to form our dataset.

3.3.2

Detection Result

For each experiment, we run the 10-fold cross-validation on the dataset. We generate
different sets of features for these datasets by ways explained in previous sections and
apply three different machine learning methods to build our detection system. For
each case, we compute several performance metrics to evaluate our system: Accuracy,
Precision, Recall, and F-measure. To compare the performance with other methods,
we also implement two popular approaches based on our dataset.
Result Based on F1. We first implement our system based on Subpath Existence
Feature (F1). Table 3.1:F1 shows the result of applying SVM, Decision Tree, and
Random Forest on F1. F1 consists of 22,464 subpaths in total extracted from the
training set; thus the numeric vector consists of 22,464 attributes. Building our
classifier with the high-dimensional data costs a significant amount of time. To reduce
the dimension of this feature set, we apply Principal Component Analysis (PCA) [73]
on our dataset. After applying PCA, there are only 30 transformed attributes left to
form a new numeric vector. We choose 30 components because more than 99% of the
variance can be retained after applying PCA.
We compare four metrics for each classification method in Table 3.1. The accuracy
for F1 when using SVM is 79.3%; however, Decision Tree achieves the highest accuracy
at 84.3%, and Random Forest achieves the accuracy of 83.3%. It is also worth noting
that F1 is similar to the modality feature used by DroidMiner. As such, we can
also regard GranDroid’s performance based on F1 as that of a reimplemented
DroidMiner being applied to our dataset, i.e., the reported results for F1 are
representative of the results of DroidMiner.
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F1

F2

F3

F4

F3 ∪ F4

SVM DT RF SVM DT RF SVM DT RF SVM DT RF SVM DT RF
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
I. Accuracy

79.3 84.3 83.3 60.3 82.7 83.0 88.7 86.3 87.7 50.3 91.0 91.7 50.3 89.0 92.3

II. Precision

71.6 95.6 94.6 55.9 74.7 91.6 92.6 85.2 86.5 50.2 87.7 91.9 50.2 88.7 92.1

III. Recall

97.3 72.0 70.7 97.3 98.7 72.7 84.0 88.0 89.3 100 95.3 91.3 100 89.3 92.7

IV. F-Measure 82.5 82.1 80.9 71.0 85.1 81.0 88.1 86.6 87.9 66.8 91.4 91.6 66.8 89.0 92.4

Table 3.1: The performance of GranDroid using five different features (F1 – F4,
F3 & F4) and three different Machine Learning algorithms: Support Vector Machine
(SVM), Decision Tree (DT) and Random Forest (RF).
Result Based on F2. As explained in Section 3.2, Subpath Frequency Feature (F2)
is based on F1. It builds a feature vector based on the frequency of each subpath.
We also apply PCA to reduce the data dimension. Table 3.1:F2 shows the detection
result. For F2, Decision Tree achieves the highest F-measure of 85.1%. It achieves
an accuracy of 82.7% with 74.7% precision and 98.7% recall. It appears that F2 only
slightly affects the overall performance of our system.
Result Based on F3. F1 and F2 are created by checking the existence and frequency
of subpaths in the training set. In essence, these first two vectors can be classified as
signature-based features as they correlate the existence of a subpath and its frequency
to malware characteristics. For example, if many malware samples contain subpaths
S1 and S2, we would regard apps that have both S1 and S2 as malicious. However,
if only S1 appears in the training set, S2 may be ignored when generating features.
This is a significant shortcoming of this signature-based method.
To overcome this shortcoming, we extract statistical information from SNP to
construct Path Statistic Feature (F3). As illustrated in Table 3.1:F3, F3 achieves
higher performance than F1 and F2 in terms of all four metrics. This indicates that
statistical information related to paths is an essential factor that can improve detection
performance. When we apply the three algorithms, we find that SVM performs slightly
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Random Forest Comparison
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Figure 3.7: Performance of Random Forest
better than Decision Tree and Random Forest for F3 as it achieves an F-measure of
88.1%. In contrast, the other two approaches (Decision Tree and Random Forest)
achieve 86.6% and 87.9%, respectively.
Result Based on F4. Besides the statistical feature from paths, we also convert the
size of all the graph and feature files into numeric vectors. We refer to this feature as
File Statistic Feature (F4). Table 3.1:F4 shows the result based on F4. F4 surprisingly
outperforms F1, F2 and F3. When F4 is used with Random Forest, it can achieve
an F-measure of 91.6%. This also indicates that the volume of generated features
(represented as file sizes) is a strong differentiator between malicious network behaviors
and benign ones.
Result Based on F3

S

F4. We have shown that statistical feature sets, F3 and F4,

provide higher detection accuracy than F1 and F2. Intuitively, we hypothesize that
we may be able to further improve performance by combining F3 and F4. To do so,
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we concatenate the feature vector of F3 with the feature vector of F4 and refer to the
combined vector as F 3 ∪ F 4.
Table 3.1:F3∪F4 validates our hypothesis. In this case, Random Forest achieves
92.3% detection accuracy, which is better than using either feature individually.
Figure 3.7 graphically illustrates the comparison of different feature sets via Random
Forest, which also shows that F3 ∪ F4 yields the best F-Measure.

3.3.3

Evaluating Aggregated Features

By concatenating F3 and F4, we can achieve better performance than using those two
features individually. However, we hypothesize that the richness of path information
contained in F1 and F2 may help us identify additional malicious apps not identified
by using F 3 ∪ F 4. As such, we first experiment with applying Random Forest on a
new feature based on concatenating all features (F 1 ∪ F 2 ∪ F 3 ∪ F 4). We find that
the precision and F-measure are significantly worse than the results generated by just
using F 3 ∪ F 4 due to an increase of false positives.
Next, we take a two-layer approach to combine the classified results and not the
features. In the first layer, we simply use Random Forest with features F 1, F 2, and
F 3 ∪ F 4, to produce three classification result sets (θF 1 , θF 2 , θF 3∪F 4 ). As Table 3.1
shows that the results in θF 1 and θF 2 contain false positives, we combat this problem
by only using results that appear in both result sets (i.e., θF 1 ∩ θF 2 ). We then add the
intersected results to θF 3∪F 4 to complete the combined result set (θcombined ). θcombined is
then used to compare against the ground truth to determine the performance metrics.
In summary, we perform the following operations on the three classification result sets
produced by the first layer:

θcombined = θF 3∪F 4 ∪ (θF 1 ∩ θF 2 )
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Using this approach, we are able to achieve an accuracy of 93.0%, a precision of
92.9%, a recall of 93.5%, and a F-measure of 93.2%. This performance is higher than
that of simply using F 3 ∪ F 4 as the feature for classification (refer to Table 3.1).

3.3.4

Comparison with Related Approaches

Next, we compare the performance of GranDroid to two prior approaches that
have been created to detect network-related malware. However, there are existing
dynamic analysis techniques that use network traffic behaviors to detect malware and
botnets [13, 74, 75]. These approaches try to achieve the same objective as ours but
take a different approach. The major difference is that their works observe dynamic
network traffic information while our approach focuses on programming logic that
can lead to invocations of network-related methods. The benefit of their approaches
is that the detection model is built on actual malicious traffic. If a malicious traffic
behavior is detected by executing an app, the app is then classified as malware.
Our approach, on the other hand, does not consider network traffic. Instead,
we identify executed network paths and break each path down into subpaths to
achieve more precise results. Our work also considers additional paths and methods
that are part of the executed component. So our detection model is built using
information that is beyond the dynamically generated information via execution. In
summary, their approaches use dynamically generated information to build detection
models. In contrast, our approach uses the information to explore further related
paths and methods that can be useful in detecting malware. Therefore, the amount
of information used by our approach to building the detection models lies between
the amount of information used to build dynamic analysis models and that of static
analysis models. Next, we show how GranDroid performs against two of these
purely dynamic analysis approaches.
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Approach-1: HTTP Statistic Feature. Prior research efforts have used network
traffic information to conduct the malware or botnet detection [74]. Their work
mainly focuses on extracting the statistical information from PCAP files, converting
such information into features, and then applying machine learning to construct the
detection system.

The
The
The
The
The
The
The
The
The
The
The

Feature Description
Number of HTTP Requests
Number of HTTP Requests per Second
Number of GET Requests
Number of GET Requests per Second
Number of POST Requests
Number of POST Requests per Second
Average Amount of Response Data
Average Amount of Response Data per Second
Average Amount of Post Data
Average Amount of Post Data per Second
Average Length of URL

Table 3.2: Utilized HTTP Statistic Features (Approach-1)
To facilitate a comparison with GranDroid, we reimplement their system. Table 3.2 lists all the extracted features. Table 3.3:Approach-1 shows the detection
results. As shown, Random Forest achieves the best F-measure of 80.6%. This is
significantly lower than our approach when F3 and F4 are used with Random Forest.
As a reminder, our approach achieves the F-measure of 93.2%.
Approach-2: HTTP Header Feature. Next, we compare the performance of
GranDroid to that of an approach that uses HTTP header information (four header
fields) extracted from network traffic information as features [75]. For each malware
sample, they check the corresponding traffic file generated by the sample and build
the numeric vector by checking if its header information can be found in the training
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set. The vector is a four-bit binary vector, such as <1, 1, 0, 1>. As reported, they
build a classification system that can achieve more than 90% detection accuracy [75].
We reimplement their approach and apply it to our dataset. We use four features:
host, request URI, request method, and user agent. Table 3.3:Approach-2 shows the
detection result. Note that the results of SVM, Decision Tree, and Random Forest are
correctly reported as being the same (i.e., F-measure of 78% and accuracy of 73.1%).
One reason for this behavior might be that there are only four bits in the vector,
indicating a simple structure, and therefore, all three ML methods generate the same
result.

I. Accuracy
II. Precision
III. Recall
IV. F-Measure

Approach-1
SVM DT
RF
(%)
(%) (%)
57.0
76.0 79.7
53.8
75.3 77.0
99.3
77.3 84.7
69.8
76.3 80.6

Approach-2
SVM DT
RF
(%)
(%) (%)
73.1
73.1 73.1
65.8
65.8 65.8
96.0
96.0 96.0
78.0
78.0 78.0

Table 3.3: The performance comparison of two different approaches (Approach 1
and Approach 2) and three different Machine Learning algorithms: Support Vector
Machine (SVM), Decision Tree (DT) and Random Forest (RF).

In summary, GranDroid outperforms two other popular approaches in terms of
Android malicious network behavior detection. We observe that the overall performance of Random Forest is better than other classifiers. Table 3.4 summarizes the
overall performances of all approaches consisting of DroidMiner (F1), Approach1, Approach-2 and GranDroid. For DroidMiner’s results, we use the Decision
Method
Accuracy
F-Measure

DroidMiner (F1)
(%)
84.3
80.9

HTTP (Approach 1)
(%)
79.7
80.6

HTTP (Approach 2)
(%)
73.1
78

Table 3.4: Detection Result Comparison

GranDroid
(%)
93.0
93.2
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Tree. For GranDroid’s results, we use Random Forest. We see that GranDroid
achieves higher detection accuracy and F-measure than other approaches. Particularly, GranDroid achieves a 93.0% detection accuracy, much higher than that of
DroidMiner (84.3%), that of Approach-1 (79.7%) and that of Approach-2 (73.1%).
Furthermore, GranDroid also achieves a higher F-Measure than those of other
approaches.

3.3.5

Average Malware Detection Time

The goal of GranDroid is to provide time-sensitive malware detection for security
analysts. As such, the steps to detect malware are as follows, assuming that we already
build the detection model. In the first step, GranDroid relies on dynamic analysis to
generate runtime information. We typically run each app for a fixed time (five to eight
minutes) to generate the three graphs (classloader, class, and method call graphs). As
previously mentioned, these graphs have been appended with results from the partial
static analysis so that the method call graph also includes other unexecuted paths.
Note that our execution time is determined by the amount of time UIAutomator
needs to exercise reachable buttons. However, we can also set the time limit by using
Monkey2 to generate event sequences. In the second step, we extract the four features
(F1 – F4) to be used for classification. In the third step, we submit these features to
our previously generated model to determine whether the submitted app is malicious
or benign. As such, the malware detection time consists of the time to complete these
three steps. On average, the time to execute an application using UIAutomator was
489 seconds, our feature extraction time was 1.76 seconds, and the model training
time using Random Forest, the best performing algorithm, was 1.14 seconds.
Consider a situation when a security analyst needs to vet an app for malicious
2

Available from: https://developer.android.com/studio/test/monkey.html.
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components. With Bouncer, each app is executed for 5 minutes to observe if
there are any malicious behaviors. Our approach also executes an app for about 8
minutes. Within that time, it can achieve the average accuracy and F-measure that are
comparable to those achieved by approaches that rely on sound static analysis. Based
on this preliminary result, GranDroid has the potential to significantly increase the
effectiveness of dynamic vetting processes commonly used by various organizations
without incurring additional vetting time.
In addition, the time requires to train a detection model is also very short (i.e.,
1.14 seconds). This means that we can quickly update the model with newly generated
features, which indicates that GranDroid can be practically used by security analysts
to perform time-sensitive malware detection.

3.4

Discussion

We have shown that GranDroid can be quite effective in detecting network-related
malware. However, similar to other hybrid analysis or classifier based detectors,
GranDroid also has several limitations.
First, as an approach that relies on executing apps, the quality of event sequences
used to exercise the apps can have a significant impact on code coverage. Currently,
automatically generating event sequences for Android apps that can reach any specific
code location or provide good coverage is still an open research problem [76]. As
such, our system can perform better if we have a better way to generate input that
can provide higher code coverage. In this regard, employing static analysis would be
able to explore more code, but it might not be able to adhere to a strict vetting time
budget.
Second, our analysis engine, Jitana, only works on dex code and cannot analyze
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native code. As such, implementations of network-related APIs that utilize JNI to
execute native code directly would not be fully analyzed. However, analyzing dex
code and native code is typically done in two separate steps, so our approach can still
be incorporated into any cross-domain analysis approaches.
Third, as a learning-based detector, evasion is a common problem as cybercriminals
may try to develop attacks that are so much different than those used in the training
dataset [77]. However, as mentioned by the authors of DroidSIFT, semantic- or
action-based approaches are more robust and resilient to attack variations than
syntax- or signature-based approaches [63]. This is because semantic- or action-based
approaches focus their efforts on actual events. It is difficult to instigate a particular
network related event (e.g., downloading a malicious component) without utilizing
network-related APIs. While it is possible for cybercriminals to evade our detector, it
would require significantly more effort than trying to evade signature-based detectors.
Fourth, our current implementation only supports network-related APIs, which are
widely used to carry out malicious attacks. However, our approach can be extended
to cover other classes of APIs. The key to doing so is to identify relevant APIs that
can be exploited to conduct a specific type of attack. For example, a malicious app
that destroys the file system would need to use file-related APIs. Fortunately, there
are already existing approaches that can help to identify these relevant APIs [78].

3.5

Related Work

Network traffic has been used to detect mobile malware. Notably, prior research
efforts aim at detecting malicious behaviors through network flows by capturing actual
network traffic [13, 74, 75]. However, these studies have also shown that such systems
can be evaded by simply delay malicious behaviors so that only benign traffic is
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generated within the observation window. Another important observation is that
malicious attacks often occur through invocations of various network APIs, which are
provided by the Android framework. Therefore, merely looking at the usage of such
APIs is not sufficient to distinguish between benign and malicious apps as both types
of apps with network functionalities would need to use those APIs. Our approach tries
to overcome this ambiguity by considering execution paths that include framework,
system, and the third-party library’s code that often invokes network-related APIs [8].
Past research efforts to address this problem statically analyze various program
contexts to help distinguish between benign and malicious apps [6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11].
AppContext creates contexts by combining events that can trigger the securitysensitive behaviors (referred to as activation events) with control flow information
starting from each entry point to the method call that triggers an activation event
(referred to as context factors). Machine learning (i.e., SVM) method is then applied
to these contexts to detect malware, achieving 92.5% precision and 77.3% recall. The
average program analysis time is about 5 minutes per app [10]. However, they analyze
much older apps, and newer apps are more complex and can take a longer time to
analyze [61].
Another approach is DroidMiner, which applies static program analysis to
generate a two-tiered behavior graph to extract modalities (i.e., known logic segments
in the graph that correspond to malicious behaviors). It then aggregates these
modalities into vectors that can be used to perform classification. Their evaluation
result indicates that DroidMiner achieves a detection rate of 95.3% and a false
positive rate of 0.4%. The average time spent to extract modalities is 19.8 seconds [8].
It is worth noting that their approach suffers from scalability issues. As the number
of methods in an app increases from 5,000 to 19,000, the analysis time also increases
from a few seconds to over 250 seconds [79].
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The work that is most closely related to our work is DroidSIFT [63], which uses
API dependency graphs to classify Android malware. The basic idea is to develop
program semantics by establishing an API dependency graph that is then used to
construct a feature set. Because API usage ultimately determines the actions that
an app can take, focusing on API dependency makes their system more tolerant to
techniques that perform dex code transformations or polymorphic variants. This
fundamental observation is also the underlying principle of our approach. That is, we
also focus on the actions that an app can take instead of focusing on programming
syntax. However, their main feature is weighted graph similarity, while our approach
considers network path-related features that aim at detecting malicious network
behaviors.
While GranDroid takes a hybrid program analysis approach, DroidSIFT, on
the other hand, takes a static analysis approach. It uses Soot as the program analysis
platform. GranDroid presents several advantages. First, DroidSIFT only focuses
on application code and does not include the underlying framework or third-party
library code, while our analysis can capture the third-party and framework code.
Second, as a static analysis approach, DroidSIFT cannot deal with components that
are loaded at runtime through Java reflection or Android Dynamic Code Loading
(DCL). Our approach, in contrast, can easily deal with these dynamically loaded
components. Third, their analysis time can also vary due to different application size
and complexity. They report an average detection time of 3 minutes, but the detection
time for some apps can exceed 10 minutes. Thus, the approach cannot guarantee to
complete under tight vetting time budget. We have reached out to the authors of
DroidSIFT to access their implementation to be used as another baseline system.
Unfortunately, we have not received the response.
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3.6

Conclusion

In this chapter, we present GranDroid, a graph-based malware detection system
that utilizes dynamic analysis and partial static analysis to deliver high detection
performance that is comparable to approaches that rely mainly on static analysis.
When we use Random Forest with two of our feature sets, we can achieve over 93.2%
F-measure, which is about 10% higher than the F-Measure that can be achieved by
DroidMiner when applied to our dataset. We also demonstrate that we can achieve
this level of performance by spending, on average, 8 minutes per apps on analysis and
detection. While we only focus on detecting network-related malware in this work,
our approach, by considering sensitive APIs, can be extended to detect other types of
malicious apps designed to, for example, drain power or destroy resources. Such an
extension is possible because GranDroid focuses its analysis efforts on paths that
can lead to specific API invocations. It is thus possible to detect different forms of
malware by knowing specific APIs that they use to perform attacks.
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Chapter 4

Obfusifier: Obfuscation-resistant Android Malware Detection
System

Portions of this material have previously appeared in the following publication:

Z. Li, J. Sun, Q. Yan, W. Srisa-an, and Y. Tsutano, “Obfusifier: ObfuscationResistant Android Malware Detection System,” in International Conference on Security
and Privacy in Communication Systems. Springer, 2019, pp. 214–234.

In this chapter, we propose Obfusifier, a machine-learning-based malware detector that is constructed using features from unobfuscated samples but can provide
accurate and robust detection results when security analysts submit obfuscated samples for detection. Code obfuscation is a common approach used by developers to
help protect the intellectual properties of their software. The goal of obfuscation is to
make code and data unreadable or hard to understand [23]. This, in effect, makes
reverse-engineering of their applications more difficult. Typically, there are three
major types of obfuscation methods:
1. trivial obfuscations, which most tools can easily handle,
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2. data-flow and control-flow obfuscations, which can be Detectable by Static
Analysis (DSA), and
3. encryption-based obfuscations, which often involve some forms of encryption to
hide the actual code and data.
Recently, various obfuscation techniques have been applied to malicious apps to
evade security analysis. These techniques are especially useful in defeating existing
malware and virus scanners, which often rely on signature matching or program
analysis. As will be shown in Section 4.2, we apply DSA based obfuscation techniques
to known malware samples and evaluate them by VirusTotal [24]. The analysis
results indicate that many existing techniques deployed by VirusTotal cannot detect
obfuscated malware samples and would indicate them as benign.
These DSA based obfuscation techniques change the flow of the program by adding
(e.g., junk code insertion), reordering (e.g., code reordering, function inlining, function
outlining), or redirecting code (e.g., method indirection), making them effective in
defeating malware detectors. These code manipulations can change the signatures of
a program and complicate program analysis. Besides, these techniques also change
method, variable, and class names so that static analysis techniques that look for
previously known values would fail to locate them. Also, note that encryption-based
obfuscation techniques are effective in defeating malware detectors because they “hide”
the entire code-base and data through encryption. Before running, however, these
encrypted applications must be decrypted to reveal the real codes (that may or may not
have been obfuscated using DSA techniques) and data for execution. Encryption-based
obfuscation is beyond the scope of this work.
Recently, machine learning has become widely used for Android malware detection
in the state-of-the-art systems [9, 11, 13, 25, 26, 27]. These existing systems extract
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features from benign and malware Android samples to build classifiers to detect malware. Currently, we do not obfuscate the samples used in building classifiers. However,
one recent work [28], as well as Section 4.2 have shown that when analysts submit
obfuscated Android malware samples to classifiers, these classifiers can miscategorize
them since the features used by these classifiers are now more ambiguous due to
obfuscation [29].
Our critical insight is that there are portions of codes that malware authors cannot
obfuscate because the obfuscation of them would break the functionality. One of these
portions is the API invocations into the Android framework. As a result, our feature
selection focuses mainly on the usage of Android APIs. Our approach then extracts
features that are related to such usage. In total, we extract 28 features to build our
classifier. We use 4,300 unobfuscated benign apps and 4,300 unobfuscated malware
samples obtained from VirusShare. We then test our system using 568 obfuscated
malware. The result indicates that our system can achieve 95% precision, recall, and
F-measure, corroborating the obfuscation resilience of Obfusifier.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.1 describes different
obfuscation techniques that can change a program’s structure and can be used by
malware to evade detection. Section 4.2 reports our preliminary results to investigate
the effects of obfuscation on malware detection effectiveness. Section 4.3 describes
the design and implementation of Obfusifier. Section 4.4 reports the evaluation
results. Section 4.5 discusses the limitation of our work. We describe the related work
in Section 4.6. The last section concludes this chapter.
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4.1

Background on Code Obfuscation

In this work, we use Alan, a Java-based code obfuscation tool for Android. Next,
we describe the obfuscation features supported by Alan. As will be discussed in
Section 4.4, we employed all techniques in a composite fashion to obfuscate our malware
samples to make them as challenging as possible to be detected by Obfusifier.
Disassembling & Reassembling. The Dalvik bytecode in the DEX file of the
Android app can be disassembled and reassembled. The arrangement of classes,
strings, methods in the DEX files can be changed in different ways. In other words,
the architecture or the arrangement of the DEX files can be modified, and this
transformation creates changes that significantly alter the structures of the program,
rendering signature-based detector ineffective.
Repackaging. Developers must sign their Android app before it is released to the
market. Cybercriminals can unzip the released Android app and repack it via tools in
the Android SDK. After repacking, hackers must sign the repackaged app with their
own keys, because they do not have the developers original keys; this newly signed
app does not have the same checksum with the original app. This process neutralizes
the effectiveness of malware detectors that compare checksums primarily for detection.
Data Encoding. The strings and arrays in the DEX files can be used as signatures
to identify malicious behaviors. Encryption of strings and arrays can make signaturebased detection ineffective [80].
Code Reordering. This feature aims to change the order of the instructions randomly, and the original execution order is preserved by inserting goto instructions.
Because this reordering is random, the signature generated by this malware would be
significantly different from the signature of the original malware. This approach is by
far the strongest obfuscation technique for evading the signature-based detectors [81].
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Junk Code Insertion. This technique does not change the programming logic of
the code. As such, compared with other transformations, its impact towards the
detector is less significant, and malware only obfuscated with Junk Code Insertion
are very likely to be detected [82]. There are three common types of junk codes: nop
instructions, unconditional jumps, and additional registers for garbage operations.
Identifier Renaming. This transformation modifies package and class names with
random strings to evade signature-based detection.
Call Indirection. Some malware scanners take advantage of the structure of the
method graphs to generate signatures. The original method call can be modified by
inserting a newly and randomly generated method before calling the original method.
This transformation can insert many irrelevant nodes into the method call graph of an
obfuscated app. If a detector is relying on a signature based on a method call graph,
this obfuscation technique can be effective in evading the detection. Furthermore, a
machine learning detector based on method call graph features would also likely fail
to detect malware samples employing this obfuscation technique.

4.2

Effects of Obfuscation on Malware Detection

Obfuscation techniques that can transform the structure of an application have
the potential to allow malware to evade detection of many antivirus scanners. To
elaborate and quantify the magnitude of this phenomenon, we investigated the effects
of obfuscations on the effectiveness of existing virus scanners. The data collection
process to conduct our experiments (described next) and the subsequent evaluation of
our proposed system is described in Section 4.4.
In the first experiment, we assessed the effect of obfuscation on the accuracy of
detection by about 60 scanners deployed by VirusTotal [24]. The experiment involved
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randomly selecting 30 malware samples from VirusShare (we downloaded them in
June, 2018). We then applied obfuscation using Alan, a Java-based code obfuscation
tool that is capable of applying several types of structure-altering transformations,
including code reordering, junk code insertion and call indirection directly on DEX
code of an Android app [28,83]. Once these apps have been obfuscated, we resubmitted
them for scanning again on VirusTotal. We report the scanning result in Figure 4.1.
VirusTotal Result Of Original Malware
VirusTotal Result Of Obfuscated Malware
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Figure 4.1: The Difference in Detection Rate of Original and Obfuscated Malware
In the figure, the horizontal axis lists malware ID (from 1 to 30). The vertical
axis presents how many antivirus scanners identify an app as malware. The light
blue bar is the detection number for the original app, and the red twilled bar is the
result of the obfuscated app—the number of scanners that can accurately identify
each obfuscated app as malicious decreases dramatically. The most significant drop
occurs in App 9 as 42 scanners detect its unobfuscated version, but only 16 scanners
detect its obfuscated version–a reduction of 62%.
In the second experiment, we focused on the accuracy of 14 popular scanners in
detecting obfuscated malware. We randomly obfuscated 1,540 apps using Alan. Table 4.1 shows the detection difference between these 1,540 unobfuscated malicious apps
and their obfuscated versions. The scanner Antiy-AVL can identify 1,427 as malware
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before obfuscation, but can only identify 260 obfuscated versions. The difference between McAfee and Symantec is 641 before and after obfuscation, which is surprisingly
high. Ad-Aware and Baidu cannot detect obfuscated malware at all. We checked 60
scanners, and the number of scanners which could still identify the obfuscated apps as
malicious decreased by 34.4% on average. Prior work called DroidChameleon [28]
has shown that 10 popular antivirus products such as Kaspersky, AVG, and Symantec,
lose their detection effectiveness when used with obfuscated malware samples.
Scanner

Number of detected (original) Number of detected (obfuscated) Differece

Antiy-AVL

1427

260

1167

MAX

1429

463

966

Comodo

999

122

877

F-Prot

830

54

776

Alibaba

975

291

684

K7GW

1348

679

669

McAfee

1446

805

641

Symantec

763

122

641

McAfee-GW-Edition

1265

669

596

DrWeb

1119

607

512

BitDefender

464

20

444

eScan

434

2

432

Ad-Aware

430

0

430

Baidu

308

0

308

Table 4.1: Detection Difference By Scanners
We conducted the third experiment to understand the effects of obfuscation on
malware detection effectiveness of existing scanners. To do so, we focused our analysis
on a malware sample that belongs to Adware:android/dowgin [84] family, which is
an advertising module that can leak or harvest information such as its IMEI number,
location, and contact information from the device.
We then obfuscated this malware sample using Alan [85]. Before it was obfuscated,
20 scanners from the VirusTotal [24] were able to identify it as malware. However,
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after obfuscation, only 8 scanners could detect it. We statically analyzed this app and
its obfuscated counterpart. We checked its method call graph and found that there
were 4,948 methods, 7,244 function calls before obfuscation. After obfuscation, the
number of methods increased to 6,387, and the number of function calls increased to
8,683; the obfuscation process inserts some additional methods.

Figure 4.2: Obfuscation Process
Figure 4.2 illustrates this obfuscation process. we have A→B as the original
function call, but in the obfuscated graph, we have A→C, C→B instead. This is
called Call Indirection. The structure of the original method graph is modified so that
signature-based virus detectors would not be able to detect such changes.
We also compared their DEX codes. There were 93,077 lines in the original DEX
file, but there were 148,819 lines after obfuscation. Scanners that rely on the order
of the instruction as signatures would be ineffective by such changes. Prior work
called RevealDroid [29] has shown that even for machine learning-based detectors,
obfuscation is still problematic.
There is a need to create a malware detector that maintains its effectiveness despite
obfuscation. Our approach, Obfusifier applies static analysis to identify code that
cannot be obfuscated and then efficiently extracts useful features to build a machine
learning-based detection system. In the next section, we introduce our proposed
system.

4.3

Introducing Obfusifier

The main goal of the Obfusifier is to identify malicious apps, transformed via
different obfuscation techniques, and challenging to detect via common antivirus
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scanners. Thus, the features selected must satisfy the following four policies. First,
these features must give a good representation of the difference between malware
and benign apps. Second, they must produce a very high detection accuracy when
handling unobfuscated malware. Third, the detection time must be sufficiently short
for real-world application scenarios. Fourth, the system must be resilient when used
to detect obfuscated malware.

2.Graph
Simplification
3. Sensitive API
Path Generation

Features
Path Statistics,
Original/Simplified
graph Statistics,
...

Features
as
Numeric
Vectors

3. Feature Extraction

1. Graph Generation

SVM,
Decision Tree,
Random Forest,
…

4. Detection

Figure 4.3: System Architecture
In this section, we describe the architectural overview of our proposed system,
which operates in five phases: Graph Generation, Graph Simplification, Sensitive API
Path Generation, Feature Extraction, and Malware Detection, as shown in Figure 4.3.
Next, we will describe each phase in turn.

4.3.1

Graph Generation

The method graph is a good representation of the malware structure based on the
calling relationship between different methods and subroutines. Each node in the graph
represents a method, and a directed edge from one node to the other shows their calling
relationship. We implement Obfusifier based on Jitana [61], a high-performance
hybrid program analysis tool to perform static and dynamic program analysis. Jitana
can analyze DEX file, which includes the user-defined code, third party library code,
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framework code (including implementations of various Android APIs), and underlying
system code. Jitana analyzes the classes to uncover all methods and generates the
method graph for the app. Obfusifier takes advantage of the calling relationship of
methods to detect malware. As shown in Figure 4.4, blocks represent methods, and
directed edges indicate calling relationships among methods. Each block contains the
name of the method, its modifiers, and the class name to which this method belongs.
Obfusifier captures the interactions of these methods, understands the semantic
information that can help detect malware.
There are three types of methods in the graph: Android API method, system-level
method, and user-defined method. All of these methods can be exploited by malware
writers to conduct malicious behaviors. The user-defined methods and the classes to
which the methods belong can be renamed, so that the malware can evade the antivirus
scanners. As such, only relying on the original method graph may not enough to build
a obfuscation-resistant detector because of the negative impact of code obfuscation.
Lightweight features can be extracted from these method graph to build the malware
detection system.

1
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Figure 4.4: Method Graph
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Figure 4.5: Graph Simplification Process
4.3.2

Graph Simplification

Our critical insight is that the Android APIs and system-level methods cannot be
transformed by code obfuscation, and we can exploit these characteristics to extract
obfuscation-resistant features. Google publishes Android APIs, so we can easily create
a list of these APIs. System-level methods include the Android OS source code and
the Linux kernel source code, so it is not as convenient to gather all these methods,
and therefore, we do not collect them. We simply rely on the list of Android APIs
that we collected.
To generate obfuscation-resistant graphs, we only keep the Android APIs in the
original method graph and ignore the system-level methods, user-defined methods,
and those from third-party libraries. For example, as shown in the Figure 4.5, nodes 1,
2, 4, 5, 6, 8 and 9 are Android APIs, and node 3 and node 7 are system-level or
user-defined method. In this situation, our system simply ignores nodes 3 and 7, and
generates a new call edge from node 1 to node 5 and another edge from node 4 to
node 7. By doing this, we remove two nodes and combine four method calls into two.
By performing graph simplification, we can reconstruct a graph that is obfuscationresistant while keeping the structural and semantic information concerning Android
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API usage of the original graph. In addition, the API-only graph contain as much
as an order of magnitude less information than the original graph, allowing feature
extraction to be much faster, especially during the path traversal phase.

4.3.3

Sensitive API Path (SAP) Generation

SAP is the program execution path from one node to the other in the API-only graph.
An SAP can be used to differentiate between malicious and benign behaviors. To
generate SAPs, we need to select the critical APIs which are used for path generation,
since these APIs reflect the semantic information about the behaviors of apps. We
analyze the call frequency of APIs and keep APIs which are used only by malware
because they can directly reflect the malicious behaviors. We also extract some
frequently used APIs by both malware and benign apps. Even though both use them,
the additional program context (e.g., method call characteristics) can still represent
the difference between malware and benign apps. In the API-only graph, we consider
all nodes whose in-degree are zero as sources and nodes whose out-degree are zero as
destinations. Obfusifier generates SAPs from sources to destinations via depth-first
search (DFS).
Figure 4.6 illustrates the process of generating SAPs. In the figure, there are two
sources (Node 1 and Node 2, marked as green) and two destinations (Node 4 and
Node 10, marked as red) in the graph. Node 1 and Node 2 are sources (in-degree is
zero) as no edges are flowing into them. Node 4 and Node 10 are destinations as they
are selected and frequently used APIs. Starting from Node 1, Node 2, and ending
with Node 4, Node 10, there are four SAPs:
1→4, 1→5→9→10, 2→5→9→10 and 2→6→9→10.
SAP reflects the running behaviors of apps, and these paths form patterns, which
can be useful to distinguish between malicious apps and benign ones.
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Figure 4.6: Sensitive API Path(SAP) Generation
Feature Extraction

We now describe the features, which our system extracts the original graphs, API-only
graphs, and SAPs.
Path Statistic Feature (F1). We collect seven statistic features from Sensitive
API Path. These features include the lengths of the longest and short paths, the
number of paths, the sum of lengths of all paths, the average length per path, the
number of methods in all paths, and the average number of methods per path. These
statistical features can indicate path characteristics and represent malicious behaviors.
For example, malware that conducts malicious behaviors tends to generate shorter and
fewer paths than benign apps. Since the paths in API-only graphs only consist of APIs,
this feature set is not affected by code obfuscation. These features are concatenated
and construct a numeric vector to reflect the unique characteristics of app behaviors
that can further represent these paths in detail.
Simplified Graph Statistic Feature (F2). We select eight features from the
simplified graph. They are the number of methods, the number of classes and the
number of edges in the graph, graph density, the average in-degree and out-degree of
the graph, the number of sources (nodes of which in-degree are zero) and destinations
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(nodes of which out-degree are zero). Compared with the original graph, the simplified
graph does not include the renamed user-defined classes and methods.
Original Graph Statistic Feature (F3). We also collect eight features from the
original graph. These features are the same as F2. Even though some of the methods
in the original graph are obfuscated, we still think these graphs can reflect malicious
behaviors. Keeping features from the original graph might still be useful to identify
malware, whether it is obfuscated or not.
Other Statistic Feature (F4). We save the original graph, simplified graph and
SAP in separate files, and use the size of these files to form three new numeric features.
We assume that the size of the file can reflect the amount of generated information,
which indicates the complexity of these graphs and paths. We also calculate the ratio
of the number of methods in the original graph to that in the simplified graph. We
also calculate the ratio of the number of classes in the original graph to that in the
simplified graph. The ratio can reflect the level of obfuscation accurately, and we
hypothesize this will contribute to the malware detection too. Finally, we form F4 as
a vector of five features.

4.3.5

Detection

In the Detection phase, we apply three well-recognized machine learning algorithms to
determine if an Android app is malicious or benign. Our proposed system utilizes four
different features (F1 - F4), as previously mentioned. Intuitively, we consider that
each of the four feature sets can reflect malicious behaviors in some specific patterns.
For API-only Graph Statistic Feature, because we remove all the user-defined classes
and methods, which are usually transformed by obfuscation techniques, to generate a
simplified graph, these features are less likely affected by obfuscation. Besides, these
features also reflect the structural difference between malware and benign apps. For
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example, we find that benign apps usually have more sources, destinations, classes,
and methods than malware. Thus, we need the Original Graph Statistic Feature
because the graph simplification process also eliminates some of the original structural
characteristics of graphs. The size of files where we store graphs and paths can also
help build our detection system, for example, we observe that the size of the file
storing graph and paths from malware is usually smaller than benign apps. We also
notice that the graph density from malware is greater than benign apps, so we gather
these file size and graph density information to form Other Statistic Feature.
We evaluated the performance of our system by using different feature sets individually. Also, we also concatenated different feature sets to construct the combined new
feature set and assess its impact on the detection result. In terms of the classification
policy, we apply three popular algorithms: Decision Tree, Random Forest, and Support Vector Machine(SVM) [68, 69, 70]. Prior work shows that these machine learning
algorithms can achieve superior performance in addressing classification problems
experienced by Obfusifier.

4.4

Empirical Evaluation

To evaluate Obfusifier, we show its detection performance in terms of accuracy,
precision, recall, and f-measure. We also illustrate its resistance against obfuscation,
and ultimately its runtime performance. We first present the process of collecting our
experimental apps, both benign and malicious, and explain how to transform malware
using obfuscation techniques. Next, we show our detection results based on different
sets of features. We also compare our system with several related approaches. Finally,
we present the runtime performance of Obfusifier.
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4.4.1

Experimental Objects

To evaluate the performance of our proposed system, we collected a dataset containing
both malware and benign apps. We downloaded 24,317 malware samples from
VirusShare [72]. Compared to Android Genome Project [36], which is often used by
many researchers [13, 86], we included more malware samples, and they are also newer.
However, they also include many of the samples in the Android Genome Project.
For benign apps, we collect 20,795 apps from APKPure [71], a third party website
providing Android apps. Note that we also used these collected apps to conduct the
experiment in Section 4.2.
To avoid polluting our benign dataset with malware samples, we cross-checked all
apps downloaded from APKPure with VirusTotal, and remove those apps identified as
malware by VirusTotal from the benign dataset. After we completed the cross-checking
process, there are only 11,238 apps left for the benign dataset. This checking process
took 29 days. Note that VirusTotal identifies all the samples in the malware dataset
as malicious.

4.4.2

Experimental Methodology

To evaluate the performance of our system, and guarantee the balance of the data,
we randomly chose 4,300 malicious samples, 4,300 benign apps as training/testing
samples from our dataset. We also applied 10-fold cross-validation.
To verify Obfusifier’s ability to resist code obfuscation, we randomly choose
another 568 benign apps and 568 malware as an additional testing set. We transform
the additional 568 malicious samples using Alan by applying all its transformations
mentioned in Section 4.1.
As previously mentioned, our system utilizes four sets of features (F1, F2, F3, F4)
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to construct our classifier and perform detection. We also use four metrics to evaluate
the performance of our system: Accuracy, Precision, Recall, and F-measure. We also
assess the performance of our system by combinations of different sets of features.
For example, by concatenating F1 and F2(F1 U F2), we form a new feature vector.
Besides, we also compare our system with several popular approaches based on very
similar dataset.
We used Macbook Pro with a dual-core 2.8 GHz Intel Core i7 running OS-X High
Sierra and 16 GB of 1.33 GHz main memory to perform our evaluations.

4.4.3

Detection Result

We discuss two usage scenarios in this section. The first scenario is when we evaluate
our classification system by 10-fold cross-validation. All samples in the dataset are
unobfuscated apps. We use unobfuscated apps to illustrate that the classifier is effective
and can detect unobfuscated malware with high accuracy. In a typical application,
we imagine that security analysts would use obtainable, unobfuscated malware, and
benign samples for training and testing. Table 4.2 reports our result.
In the second scenario, we continued to use the original unobfuscated samples
as in the first scenario for training; i.e., we used the same classifier built in the first
scenario. However, we expand the testing dataset to include 568 more benign apps
and then 568 more obfuscated malware samples (using Alan) so that we can evaluate
the ability of our system to maintain accurate detection despite obfuscation. Note
that we applied all obfuscation methods supported by Alan to make detection more
challenging, and our testing dataset also includes the same number of unobfuscated
benign apps to maintain balance.
Table 4.3 shows the result of the second scenario, in which all the testing malware
samples are obfuscated. But above all, in both cases, there are not obfuscated apps
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in the training dataset, which means we do not need obfuscated apps in the training
phase, and this characteristic guarantees that our system is robust and able to resist
to obfuscated malware. One most significant contribution of our system is that, in
the training phase, even though no obfuscated apps are needed, the system can still
successfully identify malware. Next, we discuss the results based on each feature.
Result Based on F1. Based on the Path Statistic Feature (F1), we implement and
evaluate our learning-based system. Table 4.2–F1 shows the detection result without
obfuscation in terms of three approaches: SVM, Decision Tree, and Random Forest. F1
is constructed by seven statistic features from Sensitive API Path (SAP). We generate
all the SAPs from the API-only graphs. Because obfuscation has little to no effects
on this graph, this feature set is essential to build the proposed obfuscation-resistant
malware detection system.
In the first scenario (without obfuscation), we calculate the four metrics, as shown
in Table 4.2–F1 for each classification technique based on F1. The Random Forest
and Decision Tree achieve the f-measure of 87.9% and 85.3%, respectively. On the
other hand, SVM only yields the f-measure of 60.2%. The Random Forest also has
an accuracy of 87.6%, which outperforms the SVM and Decision Tree. This result
indicates that our system can incorrectly detect malware if we only rely on F1.
In the second scenario, we assess our system with obfuscated apps. As shown in
Table 4.3–F1. Similar to the case without obfuscation, Random Forest performs better
than SVM and Decision Tree. It has an accuracy of 89.7% and the f-measure of 89.8%.
This result shows that our system is somewhat effective at identifying obfuscated
Android malware. Interestingly, by checking accuracy and f-measure for F1, the result
with obfuscation in Table 4.3–F1 is slightly better than the one without obfuscation in
Table 4.2–F1. We achieve this result because the impact of these transformations on
the SAP feature is minimal, so the system trained using SAP can resist obfuscation
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naturally. However, the SAP is from the simplified graph, which removes a lot of
user-defined methods from the original graph. Because of this, some contexts of the
program, which are helpful to recognize the non-obfuscated malware, are missing. As
such, F1 performs better when handling obfuscated malware.
Result Based on F2. API-only Graph Statistic Feature (F2) is the feature vector
directly from the simplified graph. This feature is significant because it reflects
the structural difference between malware and benign apps, and the influence of
obfuscation on F2 is minimal due to the elimination of all the newly added methods
or renamed methods(Junk Code and Call Indirection) in the obfuscated and original
graph.
Table 4.2–F2 shows the evaluation result without obfuscation. For F2, Random
Forest achieves the best accuracy of 92.9%. It also attains the highest f-measure of
93.1% with 91.0% precision and 95.2% recall. The result of F2 is better than that of
F1. This observation indicates that features directly from the graph are more effective
than features from paths.
Table 4.3–F2 shows that our system is very effective even dealing with obfuscated
malware. In terms of Random Forest, we can achieve very high accuracy of 94.3%
and 94.6% f-measure. This result validates our assumption that features from these
simplified API-only graphs, in which obfuscated methods are removed, are very useful
in identifying malware and resisting the negative impact of code obfuscation. As such,
Result
F3. on
F1F2
and
areobfuscation-resistant.
created based on API-only graphs to reduce
a systemBased
trainedon
based
is F2
more
the impact of code obfuscation on malware detection. Based on our reported results,
these two feature sets not only help to identify non-obfuscated apps, but also show a
remarkable efficacy when dealing with obfuscated malware. However, when graphs are
simplified, some structural information that is beneficial to distinguish non-obfuscated
malware might be lost. In the case that original malware samples are also available,
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F1

F2

F3

F4

F1∪F2∪F3∪F4

SVM DT RF SVM DT RF SVM DT RF SVM DT RF SVM DT RF
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
I. Accuracy

71.3 85.3 87.6 70.2 91.0 92.9 69.6 92.3 94.0 63.9 90.8 92.6 63.9 94.0 95.5

II. Precision

97.8 82.8 85.7 99.6 89.9 91.0 99.9 90.2 92.2 99.9 88.9 91.3 99.9 92.4 93.9

III. Recall

43.5 89.1 90.3 40.5 92.3 95.2 39.2 95.0 96.2 27.7 93.2 94.3 27.9 95.9 97.3

IV. F-Measure 60.2 85.3 87.9 57.6 91.1 93.1 56.3 92.5 94.1 43.4 91.0 92.7 43.6 94.1 95.5

Table 4.2: The performance of Obfusifier on non-obfuscated apps using five different
features (F1 – F4, F1UF2UF3UF4) and three different Machine Learning algorithms:
Support Vector Machine (SVM), Decision Tree (DT) and Random Forest (RF).
F1

F2

F3

F4

F1∪F2∪F3∪F4

SVM DT RF SVM DT RF SVM DT RF SVM DT RF SVM DT RF
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
I. Accuracy

73.6 89.2 89.7 71.3 92.9 94.3 51.5 90.9 80.6 50.1 89.3 91.5 50.0 93.3 90.2

II. Precision

99.3 87.9 89.1 100.0 90.5 91.2 100.0 91.7 90.4

0

88.9 92.3

0

92.5 92.7

III. Recall

47.4 91.0 90.5 42.7 95.8 98.2

1.9

89.9 68.4

0

89.9 90.7

0

94.2 87.3

IV. F-Measure 64.2 89.4 89.8 59.8 93.1 94.6

3.8

90.8 77.9

0

89.4 91.5

0

93.4 89.9

Table 4.3: The performance of Obfusifier with obfuscated apps as testing set
there is a potential to improve effectiveness by extracting features from the original
method graph to form a feature set called Original Graph Statistic Feature (F3). The
meaning of each feature in F3 is the same as F2.
As illustrated in Table 4.2–F3, F3 achieves higher performance than F1 and F2
in all three classification techniques. Random Forest performs better than Decision
Tree and SVM for F3 as it attains f-measure of 94.1% while the other two approaches
(SVM and Decision Tree) achieve 56.3% and 92.5%, respectively.
For obfuscated malware, the performance of F3 is not as good as F1 and F2. As
illustrated in Table 4.3–F3, most of the metrics show F3 cannot handle the obfuscated
apps as good as F1 and F2. For example, in terms of Random Forest, F3 only has
a f-measure of 77.9%, which is lower than those of F1 and F2, which achieve 89.8%
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and 94.6%, respectively. As such, F3 alone is not a sufficient feature set to achieve
obfuscation-resistant capability.
Result Based on F4. We transform the sizes of several files, the ratio of the number
of methods in original graph to the number in the simplified graph, and the ratio of
the number of classes in original graph to the number in the simplified graph into
a new feature referred to Other Statistic Feature (F4). We assume that these file
sizes and the ratios are also efficient features for distinguishing between malware and
benign apps.
Table 4.2–F4 shows the detection result on non-obfuscated malware. Random
Forest achieves the highest accuracy of 92.6% and f-measure 92.7%, compared with
SVM and Decision Tree. Table 4.3–F4 illustrates the result with obfuscation. Random
Forest also performs best yielding f-measure of 91.5%. Results based on F4 verify our
assumption, and these sizes of files and ratios can provide another efficient way to
build the malware detection system.
Result Based on F1 U F2 U F3 U F4. By aggregating all our feature sets, as
shown in Table 4.2, in terms of Random Forest, we achieve the accuracy of 95.5%
and f-measure of 95.5%. Table 4.3 shows that the combination of all feature sets also
works well for obfuscated malware.

4.4.4

Comparison with Related Approaches

Next, we compare the performance of Obfusifier with other research efforts including RevealDroid [29], MUDFLOW [26], Adagio [25] and Drebin [9]. More
information about these systems are available in Section 4.6.
In this work, we relied on the data provided in the RevealDroid paper as a
base for comparison. They conducted an investigation that compared the detection
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performance of RevealDroid with the other three systems. Thus, we simply
compared our system’s performance against the reported performances.
Another noticeable difference is that RevealDroid obfuscated their malware
using DroidChameleon [28]. RevealDroid applies four sets of transformations on
there dataset, including call indirection, rename classes, encrypt arrays, and encrypt
strings. We, on the other hand, obfuscated our dataset with Alan, and enabled all
transformations described in Section 4.1. In our approach, “Data Encoding” technique
includes the “Encrypt Arrays and Encrypt Strings” by DroidChameleon, and our
“Identifier Renaming" includes “Rename Classes” by DroidChameleon. The level of
obfuscation in our dataset is higher than RevealDroid, so our transformed malware
should be more difficult to detect.
The malicious apps used to investigate RevealDroid are from Android Malware
Genome [36], the Drebin dataset [9] and VirusShare [72]. Our malicious dataset is
only from VirusShare. However, the samples on VirusShare contain similar apps in
Android Malware Genome and Drebin dataset. The similarity of the dataset ensures
the fairness of comparisons.
When comparing with the other four systems, we consider two scenarios. The first
scenario is testing the non-obfuscated malware (without obfuscation). The second
scenario is testing the obfuscated malware (with obfuscation). In the first scenario,
RevealDroid splits a dataset, including 1,742 benign apps and 7,989 malicious ones
into two parts evenly. One part is the training dataset, and the other part is for
testing. The training dataset has half of the benign apps and half of the malicious
apps. For this case, we also split our dataset consisting of 4,300 benign apps and 4,300
malicious apps randomly into two parts evenly, one part for training, and the other
part for testing. In the second scenario, RevealDroid has 7,995 malicious apps and
878 benign apps in the training set, and 1,188 obfuscated malicious apps and 869
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benign apps for testing. Similar to their dataset, there are 4,300 benign apps and
4,300 malicious ones in our training set, and we form a testing set with 568 benign
apps and 568 obfuscated malicious ones.
Note that all of our samples are chosen and split randomly. Compared with the
imbalanced dataset from RevealDroid, our dataset is very balanced. When training
imbalanced data, which the number of malware is greater than benign apps, the
classifier often favors the majority class and form a biased prediction model. The
imbalance in the testing set can cause significant inaccuracy.
Table 4.4 shows the comparison result without obfuscation. Table 4.5 presents the
comparison result with obfuscated malware. Without obfuscation, as illustrated in
Table 4.4, Drebin shows the best performance with the average precision, recall and
f-measure 99%, we think this is because Drebin gathers all types of features, such as
permission, API call, intents and the diversity of the feature set plays a significant
role to detect malware. Obfusifier has the average f-measure of 96%, which is the
same as RevealDroid. Even though the performance is not as good as Drebin, both
Obfusifier and RevealDroid outperform Adagio, of which average f-measure is
90%. MUDFLOW has the worst result, with only average 71% f-measure and 66%
recall.
With obfuscation, as illustrated in Table 4.5, Obfusifier outperforms all other
four systems. This result is from feature combinations of F1 U F2 U F4. Note that
F3 is a feature set extracted from the original method graph, so the F3 feature set is
not obfuscation resistant. It achieves surprisingly high metrics, with an average of
95% precision, recall, and f-measure. Note that the f-measure of MUDFLOW with
obfuscation is only 74%. This result is very close to the result without obfuscation
(f-measure of 71%).
We suspect that this is because the obfuscation techniques do not influence its
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feature sets. Drebin shows poor performance with obfuscation; the average precision,
recall and f-measure are 0%. This is because all of Drebin’s feature sets are negatively
influenced by obfuscation, and this result indicates that Drebin is not resilient against
obfuscation. Adagio achieves the average f-measure 62% with obfuscation, but this is
not as good as its result (f-measure 90%) without obfuscation. Still, it shows the ability
to detect obfuscated malware. The average f-measure and recall of RevealDroid is
85%, which is not as high as Obfusifier.
MUDFLOW RevealDroid
(%)

(%)

Adagio

Drebin

Obfusifier

(%)

(%)

(%)

Pr Re Fm Pr Re Fm Pr Re Fm Pr Re Fm Pr Re Fm
Ben 85 34

49

90 88

89

90 76 83 97 100 98 97 94 95

Mal 87 99

93

97 98

98

95 98 96 100 99 100 94 97 96

AVG 86 66

71

96 96

96

92 87 90 99

99

99 96 96 96

Table 4.4: Comparison Without Obfuscation (Pr = Precision, Re = Recall, and Fm =
F-measure)
MUDFLOW RevealDroid
(%)

(%)

Adagio

Drebin

Obfusifier

(%)

(%)

(%)

Pr Re Fm Pr Re Fm Pr Re Fm Pr Re Fm Pr Re Fm
Ben 98 47

64

91 72

80

54 73 62 42 100 59 97 92 95

Mal 72 99

84

82 95

88

73 54 62 0

AVG 88 73

74

86 85

85

63 63 62 18 42 25 95 95 95

0

0 93 98 95

Table 4.5: Comparison With Other Methods (Pr = Precision, Re = Recall, and Fm =
F-measure)
4.4.5

Runtime Performance

For real-world applications, a malware detector must be both effective and efficient.
To evaluate the efficiency of Obfusifier, we measured the time taken to analyze and
detect a malware sample. As part of the analysis, one critical factor that can affect
efficiency is the time to train the classification model and the time needed to test each
app. The training time is the time to build the prediction model. The testing time
is the average number to test each app. Another key factor is the time we spend to
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statically analyze apps and extract its features. We also list the average time needed
to analyze each app in different phases: Graph Generation, Graph Simplification, SAP
Generation, and Feature Extraction. We measure the time of 100 apps (50 benign
and 50 malicious apps, respectively) and calculate the average execution time for each
app in each phase. We found the system took the average total of 35.06 seconds to
analyze each app, generate graphs, simplify paths, and extract features. This runtime
result should be acceptable for detecting obfuscated and sophisticated malware in
real-world settings.

4.5

Discussion

Our evaluations have shown Obfusifier’s robustness, and its ability to handle
obfuscated Android with high efficiency and accuracy. However, there are still some
limitations of our system.
First, we only obfuscate malicious apps using Alan. According to the results from
VirusTotal, Alan provides several very effective obfuscation techniques that help
malware evade many existing antivirus scanners. However, to verify Obfusifier’s
ability to deal with different obfuscation techniques, we plan to experiment with more
Android obfuscation tools, such as DashO [87], DexGuard [88] to transform malware.
Second, our system cannot handle the malware transformed by the obfuscation
on the native code. Malware authors can take advantage of this loop-hole to encrypt
the strings and arrays in the native code, and then decrypt them during runtime to
hide the malicious behaviors. One important tool that can close this loop-hole is
Obfuscator-LLVM [89], which targets the native code obfuscation. We plan to
experiment with this tool and attempt to integrate it into our workflow.
Third, our system is based on static analysis of the DEX code, but if the DEX code
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is encrypted and then decrypted at runtime, we cannot capture its method graph and
malicious behaviors. A special obfuscation technique called packing [90], which is used
to protect Android apps from reverse engineering. It creates a wrapper application and
hides the original DEX code. This wrapper app loads necessary libraries to unpack
the original code at runtime.

4.6

Related Work

In this section, we describe closely related work, including the four baseline systems
used in Section 4.4 and other prior works about malware detection.
Garcia et al. [29] introduced RevealDroid as a lightweight machine learningbased system to detect Android malware and identify Android malware families. It
constructs features from the Android API usage, reflection characteristic, and native
binaries of the app. The evaluation shows that RevealDroid can detect malware
(both non-obfuscated and obfuscated malware) and identify malware families with
high accuracy.
MUDFLOW [26] is built on the static analysis tool FLOWDROID [91]. It extracts
the normal data flow from benign apps as patterns, mines these benign patterns, and
use these pattern to identify malicious behaviors automatically. The novelty of their
work is that they only use information from benign apps to train their system and
identify abnormal flows in malicious apps. Our evaluations indicate that MUDFLOW
has some ability to detect obfuscated malware, with a precision of 88% and f-measure
of 74%. Adagio [25] extracts the function call from Android apps and map these
function calls to features, and build a machine learning system based on these features.
As shown, the proposed system loses its accuracy when used with obfuscated malware
samples.
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Drebin [9] is a machine learning-based malware detector. It performs static
analysis on Android apps to collect many features such as permission, API calls,
intents from app’s code and the Manifest file. It embeds them in a vector space that
can be used to discover patterns of malware. These patterns are then used to build a
machine learning detection system. The system is accurate, but it requires running
on a rooted device. As shown, Drebin is not able to detect obfuscated malware.
AppContext [92] is a machine-learning-based malware detector that focusing on
the context difference between malware and benign apps. It leverages SOOT [93] as
the static analysis engine and uses the permission mappings offered by PScout [94]
to extracts the contexts in Android components, Android permissions, and Intent.
They achieve 92.5% precision and 77.3%, which is lower than our system. The average
analysis time of AppContext for each app is about 5 minutes [92], but we only need
35 seconds. This behavior-based approach might be able to resist obfuscation, and we
hope we can its source code and assess its performance over obfuscated malware in
the future.
DroidMiner [79] is a system that mines the program logic from Android malware,
extract this logic to modalities ordered sequence of APIs, and construct malicious
patterns for malware detection. It builds a method call graph for each app and
control flow graph. It also generates modalities (API paths and subpaths) from
sensitive methods. A feature vector based on the existence of modalities is formed for
classification. They replace user-defined methods with framework API functions. We,
on the other hand, remove the user-defined methods for efficiency.
DroidSIFT [63] is also a machine learning-based detector based on static analysis.
They generate weighted contextual API dependency graphs, build graph databases,
and construct a graph-based feature vector by performing graph similarity queries.
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Their features represent program behaviors at the semantic level. Note that the
average detection time is about 176.8 seconds [63], but we only need 35 seconds.

4.7

Conclusion

We introduce Obfusifier, a machine learning based malware detection system that
is highly resistant to code obfuscation. The critical insight is that obfuscation cannot
be applied to portions of code that include calls to Android APIs, kernel functions,
and third party library APIs. As such, our system extracts mainly features based
on these portions of code unaffected by obfuscation. In total, we use four feature
sets consisting of 28 features. Our results showed that the effectiveness of the system
is not affected by obfuscation. When used to detect non-obfuscated malware, the
system can achieve an average f-measure of 96%. However, when these samples are
obfuscated, the system can achieve an average f-measure of 95%, suffering only a 1%
drop in performance.
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Chapter 5

Conclusions and Future Work

In this dissertation, we have designed and implemented three malware detection
systems to detect sophisticated malware. These three frameworks aim to address
three different malware issues. First, we have introduced DroidClassifier, which
utilizes multiple dimensions of mobile traffic information from different families of
Android malware to extract features and build a malware classification system. Second,
we have developed GranDroid, which relies on partial static and dynamic graph
information, analyzes the programming logic of malicious apps, and detect malicious
network behaviors. Third, we have implemented Obfusifier, a machine-learningbased malware detector that extracts features from unobfuscated samples but can be
used to detect obfuscated malware. Our three frameworks solve the malware detection
problems from different perspectives. The evaluation results show that they are more
effective when compared to other systems.
We perform a comprehensive evaluation of DroidClassifier by using 706 malware
samples as the training set and 657 malware samples and 5,215 benign apps as the
testing set. Collectively, these malicious and benign apps generate 17,949 network
flows. The results show that DroidClassifier successfully identifies over 90% of different
families of malware with more than 90% accuracy with a feasible computational cost.
Thus, DroidClassifier can facilitate network management in a vast network and enable
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unobtrusive detection of mobile malware. By focusing on analyzing network behaviors,
we expect DroidClassifier to work with reasonable accuracy for other mobile platforms
such as iOS and Windows Mobile as well.
Our empirical evaluation of GranDroid has shown that it can be very effective
in detecting network-related malware. Our evaluation using 1,500 malware samples
and 1,500 benign apps shows that our approach achieves 93% accuracy while spending
only eight minutes to execute each app and determine its maliciousness dynamically.
GranDroid can be used to provide rich and precise detection results while incurring
similar analysis time as a typical malware detector based on pure dynamic analysis.
Our experimental evaluation has shown that Obfusifier can achieve the precision,
recall, and F-measure that exceed 95% for detecting obfuscated Android malware, well
surpassing any of the previous approaches. The training of our system is based on
obfuscation-resistant features extracted from unobfuscated apps, while the classifier
retains high effectiveness for detecting obfuscated malware.
These three implemented frameworks have already laid a solid foundation for the
detection of complex Android malware. In future work, we need to consider several
aspects to further verify our research work and improve the performance of our existing
frameworks.
For DroidClassifier, events triggered by Monkey tool are random, and therefore, may
not replicate real-world events especially in situations that complex event sequences
are needed to trigger malicious behaviors. In such scenarios, malicious network traffic
may not be generated. As such, we intend to use more sophisticated event sequence
generation approaches to generate more real-world network traffic.
Similarly, GranDroid may perform better if we have a better way to generate
input that can provide higher code coverage. Also, our current implementation only
supports detection based on network-related APIs to carry out malicious attacks.
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However, we intend to extend our approach to cover other classes of relevant and
exploitable APIs vulnerable to other types of attacks.
For Obfusifier, we only obfuscate malicious apps using Alan. We intend to
experiment with other Android obfuscation tools. In addition, we only apply classical
machine learning algorithms to build the system. One disadvantage of the classical
approach is the need to extract features manually, and it requires sophisticated feature
engineering. To eliminate the need for complex feature engineering, we plan to utilize
deep neural networks in our system. Usually, deep neural networks can achieve higher
accuracy than classical machine learning methods.
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